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Abstract
Recent compilers allow a general-purpose program (written in a conventional programming
language) that handles private data to be translated into secure distributed implementation of
the corresponding functionality. The resulting program is then guaranteed to provably protect
private data using secure multi-party computation techniques. The goals of such compilers are
generality, usability, and efficiency, but the complete set of features of a modern programming
language has not been supported to date by the existing compilers. In particular, recent com-
pilers PICCO and the two-party ANSI C compiler strive to translate any C program into its
secure multi-party implementation, but currently lack support for pointers and dynamic mem-
ory allocation, which are important components of many C programs. In this work, we mitigate
the limitation and add support for pointers to private data and consequently dynamic memory
allocation to the PICCO compiler, enabling it to handle a more diverse set of programs over
private data. Because doing so opens up a new design space, we investigate the use of pointers
to private data (with known as well as private locations stored in them) in programs and report
our findings. Besides dynamic memory allocation, we examine other important topics associated
with common pointer use such as reference by pointer/address, casting, and building various
data structures in the context of secure multi-party computation. This results in enabling the
compiler to automatically translate a user program that uses pointers to private data into its dis-
tributed implementation that provably protects private data throughout the computation. We
empirically evaluate the constructions and report on performance of representative programs.
1 Introduction
Recent advances in secure multi-party computation make it feasible to securely compute with
private data belonging to different organizations even for complex functionalities. Furthermore,
together with ubiquitous proliferation of cloud computing services, these techniques give rise to
secure computation outsourcing. For these reasons, the research community has recently developed
a number of compilers for transforming a general-purpose program into the corresponding secure
distributed implementation (see, e.g., [9, 23]). These tools aim at generality and are designed to
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translate a program written in a conventional programming language into an equivalent program
that uses secure computation techniques to protect private data. They also aid usability and make it
easier for a programmer without extensive knowledge of secure computation techniques to produce
a protocol that can be securely executed in a distributed environment.
It has been long known that any computable function can be securely evaluated by multiple
participants if it is represented as an arithmetic or Boolean circuit. This representation, however,
is not always obvious or known or may otherwise significantly increase the program size. Existing
compilers remove the need for the programmer to perform this translation manually and assemble
secure implementations from efficient building blocks for elementary operations. Thus, efficiency of
the resulting secure computation is also one of the goals that compilers target. Furthermore, the
ability to support both private (i.e., protected) and public (i.e., not protected) data or variables in
a single program adds a level of complexity to the implementation because of the need to support
interaction between public and private variables and secure data flow enforcement.
While the design goal of several compilers was to support any feature of a general-purpose pro-
gramming language (such as C in [9] and [23]), all such compilers we are aware of have limitations.
In particular, the original version of the PICCO compiler [23] provided no direct support for C
pointers (i.e., pointers were supported only in the form of static arrays) and, as a result, no sup-
port for dynamic memory allocation other than static arrays. Similarly, the original version of the
two-party compiler for ANSI C [9] supported pointers only in the form of statically allocated ar-
rays restricted to a constant size and had additional limitations (such as support for floating point
arithmetic was not available in the open source CBMC that the compiler builds upon). Thus,
support for C-like pointers – or, in other programming languages, support for the features that
pointers enable such as dynamic memory allocation, reference by pointer or address, and building
data structures – is the most crucial part of a general-purpose program that is currently unavailable
in existing compilers. Adding this support is thus the focus of our work.
In this paper, we extend the PICCO compiler [23] with pointer support. PICCO1 is a source-
to-source translator that takes as an input a program written in the C programming language
with variables to be protected marked as private and produces a C program that implements the
computation using secure multi-party computation techniques based on linear secret sharing. We
view PICCO as an attractive compiler choice because of the flexibility of the setting it uses. In
particular, the setting assumes three groups of participants: (i) input parties who hold private
inputs into the computation, (ii) computational parties who perform secure computation on secret-
shared data, and (iii) output parties who are entitled to learning the result of the computation. The
composition of these three groups can be arbitrary (in particular, including the same, overlapping,
or non-overlapping groups), which makes the setting suitable for secure multi-party computation
(SMC), delegation of the computation by multiple data owners to a subset of them or other suitable
entities or secure computation outsourcing by one or more parties. This flexibility follows from the
use of secret sharing techniques and may or may not be present in tools that build on alternative
secure computation techniques (such as, e.g., garbled circuit evaluation).
With linear secret sharing, before secure computation can commence, each input party splits
her private inputs into n > 2 secret shares, where n is the number of computational parties, and
communicates each share to a respective computational party. The computational parties then pro-
ceed with evaluating the function on secret-shared data and communicate their shares of the result
to the output parties who reconstruct the output using their shares. Any linear combination of
secret-shared integers is performed locally, but multiplication of secret-shared integers constitutes
the elementary interactive operation. Performance is then measured in the total number of inter-
1Available from GitHub at https://github.com/picco-team/picco.
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active operations as well as the number of sequential interactions or rounds, and recent solutions
based on secret sharing aim at minimizing overhead using both metrics.
When PICCO is used to perform source-to-source translation, the input program is a conven-
tional C program where each variable is marked to be either private or public. All computation
with private variables is transformed into secure arithmetic on shared data, while operations with
public variables that do not interact with private data are left unchanged. In addition to specifying
private/public qualifies for each variable, for performance reasons PICCO also allows the program-
mer to mark the places where computation can proceed concurrently (i.e., to decrease the number
of computation rounds), which also extends the conventional C syntax.
Adding pointer to support to a program that manipulates private data not only extends the
compiler to handle the full range of C programs (that do not violate secrecy of private data),
but also permits important features of programming languages, treatment of which, to the best
of our knowledge, has not been done before. As part of this work, we thus explore how pointers
to private data (including pointers with private locations) can be implemented and discuss our
design decisions. Having added support of pointers to private data, we further study common uses
of pointers in programs and the impact our implementation has on those language features. For
example, we evaluate passing arguments by references, dynamic memory allocation, and pointer
casting. Based on our analysis as well as empirical evaluation, several of these features introduce
only marginal costs. Also, one of the important topics studied in this is work is the use of pointer-
based data structures written for private data. Our results indicate that the use of pointers (to
private data) is very attractive and maintains high efficiency for several popular data structures.
In some other cases, in particular when working with sorted data, privately manipulating pointers
increases complexity of data structure operations and it might be desirable to pursue alternative
implementations.
We would like to emphasize that it is not the goal of this paper to try to develop most efficient
implementations for different data structures. Instead, the goal is to determine how pointers to
private data can be supported at a low possible cost and to what performance of typical programs
that might lead. We note that, depending on the program structure, asymptotic complexity of a
translated program might be higher than that of the original. For example, consider an if-then-else
statement with a private condition (e.g., conditional statements used in traversing a binary tree).
When data privacy is not required, only one of the two branches will be executed, but with any
compiler that produces a secure implementation both branches will have to be evaluated to hide
the result of the private condition. Then with a sequence of n nested if-then-else statements, in
the worst case the secure program might have to execute O(2n) instructions where the original
program would execute only O(n). This means that the general translation approach can lead to
an exponential increase in the runtime for programs of practical relevance. As part of this work
we show that data structures that utilize pointers to private data cover the entire spectrum of
possibilities: in one extreme, they result in no asymptotic increase over conventional non-secure
counterparts, and in another extreme, the increase is exponential. This provides insights on when
natural pointer use is very attractive and when other, alternative implementations might be desired.
While for many data structures alternative, non-pointer-based implementations may be possible,
we note that our extension of PICCO with pointers enables support for an important aspect of
modern programs otherwise not available in any secure multi-party compiler we are aware of, which
is dynamic memory allocation. Dynamic memory allocation is essential for a general-purpose
programming language, but has not been systematically studied in the context of secure multi-
party computation (e.g., even publications and compilers that run secure computation on data sets
of a large size assume that the size of the data is fixed and known at compilation time). As an
example, consider an application in which data items arrive over time. A pointer-based linked
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list will allow for a natural and graceful mechanism of memory management, that unlike statically
allocated arrays does not require complex provisions for allocating a larger buffer when the current
one becomes full, moving the data, or merging previously allocated buffers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We first give a brief overview of related work in
Section 2. After presenting background information in Section 3, we proceed with presenting our
solution for supporting pointers to private data in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss common uses
of pointers in programming, such as passing arguments by reference, dynamic memory allocation,
array manipulation, and pointer casting and their underlying implementation in our framework.
Section 6 next summarizes operations with pointers to private data and formally shows security of
the design. Section 7 analyzes various data structures built using pointers to private data. Lastly,
Section 8 presents the results of performance evaluation of representative programs that utilize
pointers (to private data) and Section 9 concludes this work.
2 Related Work
In this section we review the most closely related work on SMC compilers and secure/oblivious
data structures. Regarding the compilers, Fairplay [15] was a pioneer work that enables compi-
lation of secure two-party protocols based on garbled circuits. Its extension to multiple parties,
FairplayMP [3], implements secure computation using Boolean circuits and secret sharing tech-
niques. TASTY [8] is another two-party SMC compiler that combines garbled circuit techniques
with those based on homomorphic encryption. Sharemind [5] and VIFF [7] are multi-party compil-
ers based on custom additive 3-party secret sharing and standard threshold linear secret sharing,
respectively. All of the above compilers use custom domain-specific languages to represent user
programs. The two-party compiler for ANSI C [9] and PCF [12] both use two-party garbled circuit
techniques, where the former’s goal is to support general purpose C programs, while the latter
uses a new circuit format and employs optimizations to reduce the compilation time and storage.
Lastly, TinyGarble [20] uses hardware synthesis to optimize garbled circuits for two-party compu-
tation. All of these compilers require linear in the size of memory work to access memory at a
private location. SCVM [13], on the other hand, is an automated compiler that utilizes oblivious
RAM (ORAM) and targets two-party computation. ObliVM [14] is another ORAM-based secure
two-party computation compiler that transforms programs written in high level abstractions to
optimized garbled circuit implementations. Finally, a recent compiler Frigate [17] was designed to
guarantee correctness of programs compiled into circuits for secure two-party computation.
To support data structures in the SMC framework, several solutions [21, 10, 16, 22] have been
proposed. The main motivation of this line of work is the need to store and manipulate private
data in an efficient and flexible manner. Toft [21] proposed a private priority queue that has
a deterministic access pattern as opposed to randomized ones in ORAM-based data structures.
On the other hand, Keller and Scholl [10] introduced implementations of arrays, dictionaries, and
priority queues based on various flavors of ORAM implementations. Mitchell and Zimmerman
[16] also provide implementations of stacks, queues, and priority queues based on oblivious data
compaction and an offline variant of ORAM. Wang et al. [22] proposed implementations of maps,
sets, priority queues, stacks, and deques based on ORAM techniques modified for specific data access
patterns. Different from all of these publications, our work includes extending the PICCO compiler
to support dynamic data structures in a generic way as found in general purpose programming
languages. That is, the programmer has the basic tools and primitives that enable her to build any
desired data structure.
In our implementation, a pointer to private data may store one or more locations where the
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data might reside, which in the worst case is linear in the program’s memory size. ORAM-based
techniques, on the other hand, guarantee that when an item is accessed at a private location,
the number of accessed memory locations is polylogarithmic in the total memory size. Thus, our
general solution may or may not be faster than using ORAM, depending on both the program and
the data size. As we discuss later in this work, employing ORAM techniques can be beneficial for
certain data structures (and sufficiently large data sets). Building custom data structures, however,
is beyond the scope of this work.
One of the applications that the compiler can naturally be used for once support for pointers
to private data is in place is evaluation of a context-free grammar on private data (implemented
as a shift-reduce parser using a stack). The grammar can be either public or private, and in the
latter case execution will correspond to evaluation of private expressions/programs on private data.
Techniques for evaluation of private programs (on private data) are a separate area of research,
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this work, but the reader may refer to recent results in
this areas such as those in [11, 19].
3 Background Information
PICCO uses Shamir secret sharing [18] for implementing secure arithmetic and other operations
on private data. It is an (n, t)-threshold linear secret sharing scheme, in which a private value is
represented using n > 2 secret shares, one held by each computational party. Then any t + 1 or
more shares can be used to reconstruct the private value, while t or fewer parties cannot learn any
information about the shared value (which is perfectly protected in the information-theoretic sense).
In a linear secret sharing scheme, a linear combination of secret-shared values can be performed
by each computational party locally, without any interaction, while multiplication of secret-shared
values requires communication between all of them. With Shamir secret sharing, computation takes
place over a field of a desired size (larger than any value that needs to be represented). A secret
s is represented using a random polynomial of degree t with the free coefficient set to s, and each
share corresponds to the evaluation of the polynomial on a distinct non-zero point. Given t + 1
or more shares, the secret can be reconstructed using Lagrange interpolation. Then addition or
subtraction of secret-shared values, or multiplication of a secret-shared value by a known integer can
be performed by each party locally using its shares. Multiplication involves multiplying two shares,
which raises the corresponding polynomial degree to 2t, and resharing and interpolating the result
to bring the degree of the corresponding polynomial from 2t to t. This imposes the requirement
that t < n/2. With the way multiplication is performed, it is also possible to evaluate any multi-
variate polynomial of degree 2 over secret-shared integers with a single interaction. That is, we
first evaluate the polynomial and re-share the overall result instead of doing so for the intermediate
products. This serves as a powerful optimization tool when, for instance, the dot product of two
secret shared vectors/arrays needs to be computed, which results only in a single interaction.
While the regular field operations achieve perfect secrecy, implementation of some of the basic
operations used in PICCO (such as comparisons, division, etc.) is statistically secure, which requires
the bitlength of the field elements to be increased by the statistical security parameter. This
slightly increases the cost of field operations, as well as the amount of communication associated
with transmitting field elements. The optimal size of field elements is automatically determined by
PICCO for each program it compiles.
Performance of these techniques is measured in terms of the total number of elementary in-
teractive operations (field multiplications or reconstructions of a value from its shares) as well as
the number of sequential interactions or rounds. For that reason, PICCO supports a number of
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optimizations to reduce the round complexity of programs that it outputs through concurrent or
batch execution.
Support for pointers to private data (and the corresponding functionalities such as dynamic
memory management) was the only missing functionality in PICCO. Thus, we modify the compiler
to enable it to compile user programs that contain pointers to private data, which was not previously
available. Our changes to the compiler affect only pointers to private data and the introduction of
two built-in functions for memory allocation and deallocation (called pmalloc and pfree) associated
with pointers to private data.
4 Adding Pointer Support
Recall that in C a pointer is a variable of a special type that stores a location in memory at which
data of a particular type can be located. Because a pointer stores an address, it can be treated
very generally with the possibility of directly manipulating pointers, changing the addresses they
store, dereferencing a pointer to access the data to which it points, casting a pointer of a particular
type to a pointer of another type, and using pointers to functions.
4.1 Working Toward a Solution
When working with pointers in the presence of private data, besides traditional C pointers to
public variables, we can distinguish between pointers to private data that (i) point to a single
known location where the private data is stored and (ii) point to a memory pool or a number
of locations where private data is stored and the location of the private data is not known. In
determining how this can be implemented in a C-like programming language, we considered pre-
allocating memory pools for pointers with private locations. Such memory pools would be required
for each data type to ensure that we can store and extract private data correctly. This approach,
however, has severe disadvantages, which are:
1. Using memory pools unnecessarily increases the program’s memory footprint, where one
pool will be needed for each used data type including complex types defined via the struct
construct. Furthermore, it is not clear to what size each pool should be set to optimize
performance.
2. It would also often incur unnecessarily large computation costs due to the need to touch all
locations within a memory pool per single access (or touch several locations when the pool is
implemented using more complex ORAM techniques). As will be evident later in the paper,
there are large classes of programs, applications, and data structures, where a pointer to
private data always corresponds to a single location, which removes the need to use secure
multi-party computation techniques for pointer manipulation. Allowing a pointer to store a
single known location drastically improves program performance compared to using pointer
pools.
3. Memory pools would also not work in the presence of pointer casting.
Then if we do not want a pointer to initially point to a pre-allocated memory pool, would the
decision to properly declare a pointer as pointing to a single (known) location or a set of locations
be left to the programmer? This is going to introduce an additional burden for a programmer
who would need to know at a variable declaration time whether the variable of a pointer type will
require protecting its value. This happens if the pointer is used inside a conditional statement with
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private condition, which then requires protecting the location assigned to the pointer to protect
the result of the condition evaluation.
To ease programming burden and at the same time avoid consuming unnecessary (memory and
computation) resources, our solution is to use the same programming interface for all pointers that
are to point to private data. When the pointer is being declared or initialized, it has one known
location associated with it (if the pointer is not initialized, that location is set to the default value
corresponding to uninitialized pointers). Throughout the computation, the pointer, however, may
be pointing to multiple locations, one of which is its true location. This happens when the pointer’s
value is modified inside conditional statements with private conditions as illustrated next. Suppose
we declare variables a and b to be private integers followed by the code below:
1. private int *p;
2. p = &a;
3. if (priv-cond) then p = &b;
We see that variable p was declared as a pointer to a private integer, but the type of the pointer
with respect to whether the location itself is private is implicit. After executing lines 1–2, p has a
single known location, but after executing line 3, p is associated with a list of two locations (the
address of a and the address of b) and the value of the true location is protected. That is, a pointer
always starts with a single publicly known location and the location to which it is pointing may
become private, but the user does not declare the pointer itself as public or private. In the rest of
this work, we use the term “public location” in reference to a pointer to private data to mean that
the pointer has a single known location (either initialized or uninitialized) and we use the term
“private location” to mean that the pointer has a list of public locations, but which location is in
use remains private.
When we consider interaction of public and private values in connection to the use of pointers,
a number of questions arise, which we address next.
1. Can a pointer that was declared to point at private data be assigned address of public data?
Note that without the use of pointers, the equivalent actions are generally allowed. That is, a
variable declared to hold private data can be assigned a known value, which is consequently
converted into protected form. The same does not hold for pointers and we disallow assigning
locations of public variables to pointers which were declared to point to private data. To
see why, suppose that a user program contains the code below where a was declared to be a
private integer, while b is a public integer:
1. p = &a;
2. if (priv-cond) then p = &b;
3. *p += 1;
After executing lines 1–2, p stores two addresses and the true location of where it is pointing
out of these two addresses is protected. On line 3, however, the pointer is dereferenced and
the result of private condition priv-cond evaluation is revealed by examining the value of b
before and after line 3. Thus, to eliminate information leakage, pointers to private data can
be assigned only locations that store private values.
2. Can a pointer declared to point to public data be modified inside conditional statements with
private conditions and as a result become pointing to multiple locations? The answer to this
question is No. If a pointer to public data is updated in the body of a conditional statement
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with private condition, it must be treated as a pointer to private data (otherwise, using its
dereferenced value reveals unauthorized information). Allowing such uses and performing the
conversion implicitly by the compiler will be confusing to the programmer (who no longer
can use the pointer to store addresses of public data). For that reason, we disallow updates
to pointers to public data within the body of conditional statements with private conditions.
4.2 Pointer Implementation
We next proceed with describing how pointers to private data are implemented to realize the ideas
outlined above. We note that all program transformations that we describe preserve semantics of
the original program and, given that a program can be compiled into the corresponding secure
implementation, the transformed program will always produce the same output as the original
program. There are some restrictions that user programs must meet in order to be compiled into
secure implementations with no information leakage. Such restrictions include the two cases at the
interaction of public and private data described above and additional restrictions inherited from
PICCO (e.g., the fact that the body of a conditional statement with a private condition cannot have
public side effects, a loop termination condition should be public or made public, etc.). This is to
ensure that no information leakage in the compiled program can take place, and the programs that
do not meet the requirements are aborted at the compilation time. Once these constraints are met,
our extension of PICCO will allow any user program to be compiled into its secure counterpart.
Pointer representation. As we incorporate support for pointers, we first note that pointers to
public data will not need to be modified and their implementation remains the same as in the
C programming language. The most significant change in implementing pointers to private data
comes from the need to maintain multiple locations. For that reason, the data structure that we
maintain for pointers to private data consists of (i) an integer field that stores the number α (≥ 1)
of locations associated with the pointer; (ii) a list of α addresses where the data is stored; and
(iii) a list of α private (i.e., secret-shared) tags, one of which is set to 1 (true data location) and
all others are set to 0. For the important special case of α = 1, the pointer has known (public)
location and the tags are not used.
We formalize the above pointer representation using the following invariant, which is maintained
throughout various pointer operations: among all locations stored with a pointer to a private object,
there is exactly one true location of the object and the tag corresponding to that location is set to
1, while the tags corresponding to all other locations are set to 0. This invariant is true of all
well-formed programs and may be violated only in the case of dangling pointers as detailed later.
Because we would like to employ a uniform data structure for pointers to private data of any
data type such as integer, floating point values, etc. and even pointers to a pointer, the data
structure we maintain needs to include two additional fields: (iv) an integer flag that determines
the type of data associated with the pointer (i.e., integer = 1, float = 2, struct = 3, etc.) and (v)
an integer field that indicates the indirection level of the pointer. For instance, if a pointer refers
to a private value of a non-pointer type, its indirection level is set to 1; and if it refers to a pointer
whose indirection level is k (for k ≥ 1), its level will be set to k + 1. A pointer to a struct also has
indirection level 1 regardless of the types of the struct’s fields (which can be pointers themselves).
Pointer updates. Initially, at the pointer declaration time, the number of locations α associated
with the pointer is set to 1 and the address is set to to a special constant used for uninitialized
pointers. Then every time the pointer is modified (including simultaneously with pointer declara-
tion), its data structure is updated. When the pointer is assigned a new location using a public
constant, a variable’s address, or a memory allocation mechanism (e.g., as in p = 0, p = &a, or p
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= malloc(size)), α in the pointer’s data structure is set to 1 and the associated address is stored
in the pointer’s address list. When a pointer is updated using another pointer (as in p = p1), the
latter’s data structure is copied and stored with the former.
Such simple manipulations are used only when the assignment does not take place inside the
body of a conditional statement with a private condition. Pointer assignments inside conditional
statements with a private condition present the most interesting case when the list of pointer
locations gets modified. Updating values modified in the body of a conditional statement with
a private condition already requires special handling in PICCO, and all we need is to support
a specific procedure when a variable of pointer type is being modified. We need to distinguish
between if-then and if-then-else statements, which we consequently discuss.
Consider the following code with an if-then statement:
1. p = p1;
2. if (priv-cond) then p = p2;
where p, p1, and p2 are pointers (to private data) of the same type. This is the most general
case, where on line 2 both p and p2 can have any number of locations associated with each of
them (recall that all other assignment types use a single location). When this code is written for
ordinary (private) variables of the same type a, a1, and a2, a generic way to implement this update
in PICCO and similar compilers is to first set [a] = [a1] and then compute
[a] = [c] · [a2] + (1− [c]) · [a] = [c] · ([a2]− [a]) + [a],
where c is a bit equal to the result of evaluating priv-cond. We use notation [x] to indicate that
the value of x is protected via secret sharing and computation takes place on its shares. In the
case of pointers, such a simple update does not work because this procedure would turn addresses
into secret shared values preventing the pointer from being dereferenced (without touching all
possible memory locations). Thus, after executing the assignment p = p1, we combine the (public)
locations of p and p2 and set the tags in p based on the current tags of p and p2 and the result
c of evaluating priv-cond. Let pointer p after executing the first assignment contain α1 locations
stored as L1 = {ℓ1, . . ., ℓα1} with corresponding tags T1 = {[t1], . . ., [tα1 ]} (i.e., this information was
copied from p1). Similarly, let pointer p2 store α2, L2 = {ℓ
′
1, . . ., ℓ
′
α2
}, and T2 = {[t
′
1], . . ., [t
′
α2
]}.
Note that the ordering of addresses in each L is arbitrary, but the tag ti in T must correspond
to the address ℓi at the same position i in L. Then as a result of the conditional assignment, we
compute p’s new content as given in Algorithm 1.
In the algorithm, L3 is composed of all locations appearing in L1 or L2 (repeated locations are
stored only once). We use notation L.find to retrieve the position of the element of L provided as
the argument or special symbol ⊥ is the element is not found. The tags in the output T3 are set
based on three different cases: (i) a location in L3 is found in both L1 and L2; (ii) it is found in
L1, but not in L2; and (iii) it is found in L2, but not L1. Because only tags in T1 and T2 and c are
private, only lines 7, 9, and 11 correspond to private computation.
If the conditional statement is of the form if-then-else, but p is not updated in the body of the
else clause, then the computation in Algorithm 1 is applied unchanged. If the pointer is instead
updated only in the body of the else clause, then the computation is performed similarly, but
Algorithm 1 is called with the value of 1− c instead of c.
Lastly, if the pointer is updated in both clauses of the if-then-else statement, the pointer content
prior to that statement needs to be disregarded. The pointer values used in the two assignments
are then merged as in Algorithm 1 using the result c of private condition evaluation. To better
illustrate this, consider the following code segment:
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Algorithm 1 〈α3, L3, T3〉 ← CondAssign(〈α1, L1, T1〉, 〈α2, L2, T2〉, [c])
1: L3 = L1 ∪ L2;
2: α3 = |L3|;
3: for every ℓ′′i ∈ L3 do
4: pos1 = L1.find(ℓ
′′
i );
5: pos2 = L2.find(ℓ
′′
i );
6: if (pos1 6=⊥ and pos2 6=⊥) then
7: [t′′i ] = [c] · [t
′
pos2
] + (1− [c]) · [tpos1 ];
8: else if (pos2 =⊥) then
9: [t′′i ] = (1− [c]) · [tpos1 ];
10: else
11: [t′′i ] = [c] · [t
′
pos2
];
12: end if
13: end for
14: set T3 = {[t
′′
1 ], [t
′′
2 ], . . ., [t
′′
α3
]};
15: return 〈α3, L3, T3〉;
1. p = p1;
2. if (priv-cond) then p = p2;
3. else p = p3;
After we assign p1 to p on the first line, p’s content is be overwritten with the content of either
p2 or p3 depending on the result c of evaluating priv-cond. We can see that before entering
the if-clause, the current content of p (i.e., that copied from p1) can be safely disregarded with-
out affecting its correctness. In other words, to update p inside the conditional statement, we
call CondAssign(〈α2, L2, T2〉, 〈α3, L3, T3〉, c) in Algorithm 1, where 〈α2, L2, T2〉 and 〈α3, L3, T3〉 are
contents of pointers p2 and p3, respectively.
These constructions compose in presence of nested conditional statements with private condi-
tions. For instance, after executing the code:
1. if (priv-cond1) then p = p1;
2. else
3. p = p2;
4. if (priv-cond2) then p = p3;
5. else p = p4;
p will contain the combined content of pointers p1, p3, and p4. That is, Algorithm 1 is first called
with the content of pointers p3 and p4 and the result c2 of evaluating priv-cond2, after which
Algorithm 1 is called on the result of its previous execution, the content of p1, and the result c1 of
evaluating priv-cond1.
As evident from the description above, all modifications to variables of all types (including point-
ers as well as data) inside conditional statements with private conditions require special handling
inside the compiler. For each such conditional statement, PICCO examines the list of variables
modified inside the body of the statement and updates them differently from when the modification
is not surrounded by a private condition. Thus, in the case of pointers we specify how pointers
need to be updated inside such statements using Algorithm 1 and compiler will process all variables
inside the body of conditional statements with private conditions.
Note that each pointer starts with a single location (i.e., α is set to 1) at the time of its
declaration, and the list and the number of locations α are updated during pointer assignments
10
as described above. This information is maintained only during program execution and thus the
locations that a pointer might store or their number is not necessarily known at compile time.
Pointer dereferencing. When pointer p with a private location is being dereferenced, its deref-
erenced value is privately computed from α, L = {ℓ1, . . ., ℓα}, and T = {[t1], . . ., [tα]} stored at p.
Let [ai] denote the value stored at location ℓi ∈ L. Then we compute the dereferenced value as
[v] =
∑α
i=1[ai] · [ti]. Note that with linear secret sharing this operation can be implemented as
an inner product that costs only a single interactive operation resulting in a profound impact on
performance.
When the dereferenced value is being updated, all locations in L need to be touched, but the
content of only one of them is being changed. If we, as before, use [ai] to denote the value stored
at ℓi ∈ L and let [anew] denote the value with which the dereferenced value is being updated, then
we update the content of each location ℓi as [ai] = [ti] · [anew] + (1 − [ti]) · [ai]. That is, the true
location (ti = 1) will be set to anew, while all others (ti = 0) will be kept unchanged.
In the current form, the above procedures are applicable only to pointers with the indirection
level equal to 1. That is, if pointer p is associated with a list of private locations of pointers, the
above computation will result in producing secret shared locations and the information looses its
semantic meaning. Thus, for pointers with indirection level > 1 different computation is used.
That is, now each ℓi ∈ L stores an address of a pointer pi and let each pi be associated with αi,
Li = {ℓ
(i)
1 , . . ., ℓ
(i)
αi }, and Ti = {[t
(i)
1 ], . . ., [t
(i)
αi ]}. To retrieve the dereferenced value of p, we first
compute [ti] · [t
(i)
j ] for 1 ≤ i ≤ α and 1 ≤ j ≤ αi and merge all lists Li for 1 ≤ i ≤ α. The resulting
list is thus set to L′ = L1 ∪ L2 ∪ · · · ∪ Lα and let α
′ = |L′|. For any location in L′, we compute its
corresponding tag as the sum of all [ti] · [t
(i)
j ] values matching that location in the individual lists
Li. (We can simply use the sum because only one tag can be set to 1.) The result is α
′, L′ and the
corresponding tags T ′.
To illustrate this on an example, let α = 3, T = ([0], [0], [1]), and L store the addresses of
pointers p1, p2, p3 with α1 = 1, L1 = (123), T1 = (1); α2 = 2, L2 = (189, 245), T2 = ([0], [1]);
and α3 = 3, L3 = (123, 176, 207), T3 = ([0], [1], [0]). The result of this operation is a pointer with
L′ = L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3 = (123, 176, 189, 207, 245), α
′ = |L′| = 5, and T ′ = ([0], [1], [0], [0], [0]).
To update the dereferenced value of p through an assignment as in *p = p’, each pointer pi
stored at address ℓi ∈ L needs to be updated with p’’s information. In particular, for each pi each
tag [t
(i)
j ] (for location ℓ
(i)
j ) is updated to (1 − [ti]) · [t
(i)
j ]. We also compute tag [ti] · [t
′
j ] for each
location ℓ′j in p’’s list of locations. We then merge the location list of each pi with that of p’ to
form pi’s new list. For any new location inserted into Li, its tag is set to the computed [ti] · [t
′
j ]
for the appropriate choice of j, and any location that appears on both pi and p’ lists, the value
[ti] · [t
′
j ] is added to pi’s updated tag for that location. In other words, if ti is true, we take p’’s
value and otherwise keep pi’s value.
If pointer p with a private location is being dereferenced m > 1 times, the above dereference
algorithms are naturally applied multiple times with the firstm−1 instances being the version that
produces a pointer and the last instance producing either a pointer or a private value depending on
p’s indirection level. p can then be treated as the root of a tree with its child nodes being locations
of pointers stored in its list and the leaves of the tree eventually pointing to private data (of a
non-pointer type). To perform an m-level dereferencing operation, we traverse the top m+1 levels
of the tree and consolidate the values stored at those levels (and update the values at the (m+1)st
level if the dereferenced value is to be updated).
Secrecy of pointers to private data. As previously discussed, the value of a pointer to private
data is treated as public when it stores a single location (α = 1), and it is private otherwise (α > 1).
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More generally, if pointers to private data are used in predicates or similar expressions, the result
of a predicate evaluation is public if its outcome can be determined using only public data. For
example, the outcome of an expression that compares two pointers to private data for equality is
public if (i) both pointers store a single location in their lists L1 and L2 or (ii) at least one of the
pointers stores multiple locations, but L1 ∩ L2 = ∅. In other circumstances, the outcome depends
on private tags and is treated as private.
Note that when the result of a predicate evaluation on pointers is private, it can be naturally
computed by privately determining the true location of each pointer and applying the predicate
to them. This computation, however, can be optimized for certain types of predicates to result
in faster performance. For example, in the case of pointer equality, the general solution is to
compute [ℓ1] =
∑
ℓ
(1)
i
∈L1
ℓ
(1)
i [t
(1)
i ] and [ℓ2] =
∑
ℓ
(2)
i
∈L2
ℓ
(2)
i [t
(2)
i ] and then compare [ℓ1] and [ℓ2] for
equality, while an optimized implementation computes
∑
ℓ
(1)
i
∈L1∩L2
[t
(1)
i ][t
(2)
j ], where ℓ
(1)
i = ℓ
(2)
j for
each ℓ
(1)
i ∈ L1 ∩ L2. The latter can be implemented as the inner product that costs a single
interactive operation and is significantly lower than the cost of comparing two private integers.
Because it is not always possible to determine at compile time whether a predicate evaluated
on one or more pointers (to private data) will have a public or private status (which, for example,
may depend on program’s public input), some checking will need to be deferred to run time. In
particular, if pointers to private data are used in a predicate to form a conditional statement and the
result of its evaluation is private, the usual constraints for the body of conditional statements with
private conditions apply. We address this by evaluating the body of such conditional statements for
public side effects at compile time (as in the original PICCO design). If the body contains public
side effects, the transformed program will include checks for the status of the conditional statement
at run time. If the result of evaluating the conditional statement is determined to be private at run
time (and public side effects are present in the body of the statement), execution will be aborted
with an error due to a possible information leak.
Note that the fact whether the execution is aborted or not never leaks private information,
as this decision is solely based on public data. That is, an abort takes place when (i) the result
of evaluating a predicate on two or more pointers is treated as private and (ii) the body of the
conditional statement that uses the predicate contains public side effects. Whether the result
of evaluating the predicate is public or not is public knowledge because it is determined by the
public locations stored in the pointers and the predicate itself. Similarly, whether the body of the
conditional statement has public side effects or not is based on the public code that forms the body
of the conditional statement.
Optimizations. Because the computation involved in computing a pointer’s dereferenced value is
interactive (and thus is relatively expensive) when the pointer stores multiple locations, we consid-
ered caching and reusing its result. That is, when a pointer’s dereferenced value is computed, we
can store it in the pointer structure and reuse the value on consecutive dereference operations when
there are no changes to the values stored at all pointer’s locations L between such operations. Once
any value stored at one of the pointer’s locations is modified, the cached dereferenced value needs
to be marked as out of date. A similar caching technique can also be applied to the computation on
private tags that takes place during pointer update and dereference operations. Note that private
tags can be viewed as aggregation of conjunctions of 1-bit private variables that denote the evalu-
ation results of private conditions (or their negations) in user programs. Because, once computed,
the variables will have fixed values, the conjunction results of those variables can be cached in our
framework in a lookup table and allow for their retrieval when the same conjunctions need to be
repeatedly computed. This optimization will result in considerable savings when multiple private
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pointers are updated or dereferenced within the body of a conditional statement with a private
condition. The savings due to either of the above caching optimizations are, however, application-
dependent and require additional program analysis at program parse and translation time. Thus,
these optimizations are not presently a part of our implementation.
Another possible optimization can lower a program’s memory footprint by reusing data struc-
tures created for pointers to private data. In particular, when a pointer is assigned another pointer’s
value (as in p = p1), we could have both pointers pointing to the same data structure instead of
creating its copy. When, however, one of the pointers with the shared data structure is being
modified, it should be unlinked from the shared data structure and its data structure modified
accordingly. Implementing this would require that each pointer data structure is associated with
a list of pointer variables which are using it. Furthermore, a data structure can be reused only
when all information stored in it is identical for multiple pointers (i.e., not only the locations in
L, but also the private tags in T ). Because different pointers often have distinct roles in user
programs, the expected savings are not very large. This optimization is presently not a part of our
implementation.
4.3 Pointers to Struct
We next discuss design and implementation of pointers to structs, including their representation
and the associated algorithms. Pointers to complex data types declared using struct constructs are
common for building data structures such as linked lists, stacks, and trees, and thus pointers to
structs deserve special attention.
As before, if a complex data type contains no private fields, no transformations are needed.
However, when dealing with pointers to struct with private fields, we need to address the following
questions:
1. A struct groups together a number of different variables that can be either private or public,
but the complex data type itself declared using struct is not associated with any particular
type of secrecy. When declaring a pointer to a complex data type, we thus need to determine
if a pointer to it can be treated as a pointer to private data or if it has to be treated as a
conventional pointer to a public variable.
2. When designing representation of a private pointer that points to struct, we need to take into
account the fact that fields of a complex data type can be accessed and modified independently
of each other or the struct itself. Thus, it remains as a question whether we should maintain
a separate list of addresses for each struct field or maintain only a single list of addresses for
all possible struct variables associated with the pointer.
3. The last question is whether we can reuse the previously described algorithms for working
with private pointers for updating or dereferencing pointers to structs on the individual fields
of a struct or if modifications are needed.
In what follows, we thus focus on answering these questions.
Secrecy of pointers to struct. Secrecy of a pointer to struct is implicitly determined by the
protection modes of the struct’s fields. We determined that a pointer to a complex data type can
be treated as a pointer to private data only if all fields in its declaration are private. It means that
if at least a single field of a struct is public, pointers to this data type can be of public type only.
This treatment is necessary to eliminate information leakage when pointers to structs are modified
inside conditional statements with private conditions. Consider, for example, a data type containing
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one private and one public field. If we treat a pointer to this data type as a pointer to private
data, it can be modified inside an if-statement with a private condition and have multiple locations
associated with the pointer. However, by dereferencing and observing the value of the public field,
one can determine the true location of the pointer and thus learn unauthorized information about
the result of the private condition.
Because a complex data type may contain other struct variables as its fields, the variables in
the data type will need to be checked recursively to determine whether at least one public field is
present (with provisions to skip cycles in the declarations). If none are found, pointers to this data
type are treated as pointers to private data.
Pointer to struct representation. To implement private pointers to structs, we needed to
determine whether a single list of locations is sufficient for all fields of the complex data type
(recall that all fields are private) or separate lists must be maintained. In working to answer this
question, we determine that there is no need to maintain multiple lists of locations, because the
list of locations associated with each field in the struct must be the same (adjusted for the offset of
the field within the struct). That is, values of a struct’s fields can be modified individually (e.g., as
in p->x = y), but the only way to access or modify the location of a field is through the location
of the entire struct. In other words, the list of addresses associated with a pointer to struct p (and
thus the addresses corresponding to all of its fields) can be modified only by directly updating p,
as operations of the type p->x = y do not affect the list of addresses associated with the field x.
Storing a single list has the added benefit that we can employ the same representation of pointers
to private data as for simple data types. This treatment also implies that a pointer to a struct
object will have indirection level 1 even if all fields of the struct are pointers themselves.
Operations on private pointers to struct. We represent pointers to a struct record in the same
way as other pointers. This means that operations for using pointers and updating their values
remain unchanged. To dereference a specific field of a pointer as in p->x and retrieve the value
of the variable x, also only minor changes to the previously described algorithms are needed. In
particular, all we need is to determine the offset f of the variable’s address within the record and
perform the dereferencing procedure in the same way as for pointer p itself, but instead of using
locations ℓi from L, we use locations ℓi + f . The same modification applies to the case when the
dereferenced value is modified through assignment.
If we would like to dereference p and retrieve the entire record as in rec = *p, we need to
iterate through each field of the struct and retrieve the dereference value of each field as described
above for p->x. Similarly, to update a dereferenced pointer p as in *p = rec, we need to perform
the equivalent of p->x = rec.x for each field x of the struct.
5 Pointer Uses in Programming
In this section we discuss many common uses of pointers in programming and how they are trans-
lated to our environment of computing with private data. The topics we cover are passing argu-
ments by reference, dynamic allocation of memory, array manipulation, and pointer casting. Data
structures also constitute a common use of pointers, but we discuss them separately in Section 7.
5.1 Passing Arguments by Reference
Function calls contribute to the basic software engineering principles of modular program design,
but could be expensive in terms of stack memory usage for the passed arguments. This has led to
differentiating between function calls where the arguments are passed by value and by reference.
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In the latter case, the function typically takes a pointer to the argument and all updates to the
dereferenced pointer will be visible after completing the function call (thus, arguments passed by
reference can be used for either input or output).
Passing private variables to functions by reference inherits the same benefits as for conventional
(public) variables in the programming language. The good news is that no special provisions are
needed for passing private variables by reference, resulting in efficient implementations. Further-
more, because often to pass an argument by reference, its address is supplied to a function call (as
opposed to supplying an existing pointer), the resulting pointer will have a single known location.
This allows us to enjoy the benefits of avoiding using extra resources without the slowdown of
working with pointers with private locations.
5.2 Dynamic Memory Allocation
Pointers are often used in programming to dynamically allocate memory on the free store and
deallocate it when it is no longer in use. Here we focus on C-style malloc() and free() used with
pointers to public variables and show what modifications are needed to support dynamic memory
allocation with pointers to private variables.
malloc() in C allocates the requested number of bytes on the heap which are passed as an
argument to the function malloc(). The result of this function is the address of the allocated
variable or the first array element in case of dynamic array allocation, which is stored in a pointer.
To support dynamic memory allocation for private variables, we start with the following code in C:
1. int* p = (int*) malloc(sizeof(int));
2. int* p1 = (int*) malloc(10*sizeof(int));
Here p points to single variable, while p1 points to a dynamic array of size 10. The assignment
operator directly saves the malloc result into the pointer because they are of compatible types.
However, this is not the case for pointers to private variables because a private pointer is represented
using multiple fields. Consequently, we cannot assign the malloc result directly to a private pointer
and use a modified interface for pointers to private variables. In particular, we use a function
pmalloc2 to implement private malloc, which is invoked as:
1. private int* p = pmalloc(10, private int);
As shown, pmalloc takes two arguments, which are the requested number of dynamic variables
and the data type. The function returns the data structure used for private pointers in our im-
plementation with α = 1 and the only location in L set to the address of the first variable in
the allocated array (when the first argument to the function is > 1). Specifying the private data
type is necessary to properly allocate and initialize the memory. For example, in PICCO a private
integer is represented using one variable of type mpz t from the GMP library [1] and a private float
is represented using four mpz t variables. Once memory for the necessary number of variables is
allocated, each of them also needs to be initialized before it can be used in computation.
Calling free with a pointer in C allows to deallocate the memory (for either a variable or
dynamic array) to which the pointer is pointing. To support similar functionality for private
variables, we implement a function pfree that similarly takes a pointer (to a private variable or
dynamic array) as its only argument. With pfree we distinguish between two different cases: the
2Note that the choice of the function is not crucial and it can be called malloc instead to simplify programmers’
effort for transforming an existing program to an equivalent program that computes with private data. We, however,
prefer to use pmalloc to make it explicit that the computation refers to private data.
15
pointer provided as an argument to the function has a single known location (i.e., α = 1) or it has
a private location out of a public list (α > 1).
Handling the first case is simple and efficient: we can simply call the free command to deallocate
memory associated with the address stored in the pointer. Pointers to private data with public
locations are very common in programs that use pointers to private data or build data structures
from private data (e.g., linked lists, stacks). Freeing memory used by pointers to private data in
such cases is thus going to be extremely efficient and does not introduce additional overhead.
Handling the second case well, however, is very challenging. This is because deallocating physical
memory results in publicly observable outcomes, and we must be extremely careful not to reveal
the true location stored in a pointer with a private location while at the same time reducing the
program’s memory usage. For example, a simple strategy of deallocating memory associated with
all locations on a pointer’s list of addresses will not be acceptable for some programs. To illustrate
this, consider a dummy example with two pointers p1 and p2, for each of which we allocate memory
using pmalloc. Then the locations to which the pointers are pointing are swapped based on the
result of a private condition evaluation. We obtain that both p1 and p2 now contain two identical
locations in their lists of addresses, but their true addresses are distinct. Suppose we process the
data to which p1 points and want to deallocate the corresponding memory. If we deallocate both
addresses on p1’s list, p2 becomes a dangling pointer and the data to which it was pointing is no
longer accessible. Thus, such an implementation of pfree would be too restrictive to permit its
general use.
Thus, calling pfree(p) should result in deallocating memory associated with only one address
on p’s list of addresses. Furthermore, the address being deallocated cannot depend on any private
data (but can be any function of public data). This means that we are not necessarily deallocating
memory associated with the true location of the pointer and other pointers that store the same
location on their lists must be adjusted to preserve correctness of the computation (which involves
additional resources). For example, we can choose to deallocate the fist location ℓ1 on a pointer’s
list, but if this was not the pointer’s true location (which we can privately check), the data stored at
ℓ1 needs to be relocated and other pointers storing ℓ1 on their lists need to be updated accordingly.
We next describe in more detail how we can realize this idea.
First, if the pointer p on which pfree was called contains the default location corresponding
to uninitialized pointers on its list of addresses L (which is public knowledge), we choose not to
perform memory deallocation. This is to ensure that no memory is being deactivated (which may be
in use by other pointers) if p happens to be uninitialized. Otherwise, we free the first location ℓ1 on
p’s list.3 (Alternatively, the location used by the smallest number of pointers can be freed.) Before
we can actually free the memory, we need to privately update the values stored at the remaining
locations in L using the value stored at ℓ1 to maintain correctness. We will need to ensure that
(i) if ℓ1 happens to be the true location, the values stored in the remaining locations will remain
unchanged and (ii) if ℓ1 is not the true location, the value stored at ℓ1 can be found at p’s true
location, while the values stored at all other locations remain unchanged. The rationale for doing
this as follows: if ℓ1 is indeed p’s true location, no additional work would be required if this fact
was public (i.e., it is the programmer’s job to ensure that freeing p does not affect other variables
still in use). If ℓ1, however, was not p’s true location, it may be in use by other pointers and the
value stored at ℓ1 needs to be relocated to p’s true location prior to memory deallocation (and the
pointers that contain ℓ1 in their lists need to be updated accordingly).
Let p at the time of calling pfree store α, L = {ℓ1, . . ., ℓα}, T = {[t1], . . ., [tα]} and A =
3In the event that data stored at the locations contained in the pointer have different sizes, the location with the
data of the smallest size should be chosen instead.
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{[a1], . . ., [aα]} denote values stored at locations in L.
4 To obliviously update [ai]’s for 2 ≤ i ≤ α,
we compute
[ai] = [a1] · [ti] + [ai] · (1− [ti]).
This satisfies the above two requirements as follows: if t1 is true (ℓ1 is the true location) and thus
ti is false, the result will be ai for any i; if ti is true and thus t1 is false, the result will be a1; if
both t1 and ti are false, the result will be ai. Surprisingly the formula does not depend on t1.
Second, we need to update private pointers that store the freed location ℓ1 in their lists (and
are still in use), but no computation needs to be performed for pointers that store any of ℓ2, . . ., ℓα
from L, but not ℓ1 itself. The rationale for doing this as follows: if ℓ1 is indeed p’s true location, no
additional work would be required if this fact was public (i.e., it is programmer’s job to ensure that
freeing p does not affect other variables still in use). If ℓ1, however, was not p’s true location, it may
be in use by other pointers and the value stored at ℓ1 is moved to p’s true location prior to memory
deallocation. We thus need to replace ℓ1 in other pointers’ lists with locations that are guaranteed
to include the value originally stored at ℓ1 and update the locations’ tags accordingly. Thus, for
each pointer p’ that stores ℓ1 in its list L
′, we retrieve ℓ1’s position pos in L
′ and its corresponding
tag t′pos. We then replace ℓ1 in L
′ with {ℓ2, . . ., ℓα} and t
′
pos in T
′ with {[t′pos] · [t2], . . ., [t
′
pos] · [tα]}.
If any of ℓi for i = 2, . . ., α already appears in L
′, that location is not included the second time and
its tag is set to the sum of the tag already present in T ′ for location ℓi and [t
′
pos] · [ti].
Returning to our example with p1 and p2, we have that prior to calling pfree(p1), p1 stores
α1 = 2, L1 = (ℓ1, ℓ2), T1 = (t1, t2), and p2 stores α2 = 2, L2 = (ℓ2, ℓ1), T2 = (t
′
1, t
′
2). Then either
t1 = t
′
1 = 1 and t2 = t
′
2 = 0 or t1 = t
′
1 = 0 and t2 = t
′
2 = 1. Once pfree(p1) is called, ℓ1 is
scheduled for deallocation. If t1 = 1, no changes take place; otherwise (t2 = 1), the data from
location ℓ1 is copied into location ℓ2. We obtain that location ℓ1 is being removed from L
′ (and
the corresponding tag t′2 from T
′) and location ℓ2 is being added to L
′ with the corresponding tag
t′2 · t2. Because ℓ2 is already present in L
′, it is stored once and the tag becomes t′1 + t
′
2 · t2. Thus,
we have that L′ now stores a single location and the tag is 1 for any possible set of original tags.
Note that the second step of updating pointers that store location ℓ1 in their lists is more complex
when the pointer p being freed points to a struct or an array. In those cases, multiple addresses
are processed in this step (ℓ1 and other valid addresses that store data at fixed offsets from ℓ1)
depending on the type of data to which p points. In our implementation, we gather all interactive
operations associated with the execution of a call to pfree and perform them simultaneously in a
single round.
If the user program is written correctly (i.e., does not leave dangling pointers after a call to
free), our implementation of pfree will maintain that for each pointer exactly one location’s tag
is set to 1 and all other locations’ tags are set to 0. When, however, a call to deallocate memory
corresponding to a pointer results in dangling pointers, all tags in such pointers can be 0. For
that reason, if a call to pfree causes the number of addresses for some pointer to reduce to 1, we
do not treat the corresponding tag as public. That is, when a program is not correctly written,
opening the value of the tag may reveal private information, while assuming that the tag is 1 may
modify the program’s behavior. Thus, our implementation maintains privacy even in the presence
of programming errors that result in dangling pointers.
We also note that the use of pmalloc or pfree will not be allowed inside conditional statements
with private conditions because these functions have public side effects.
4Although in the current discussion we assume p is a private pointer that points to a non-pointer data type, the
same idea will apply when p points to a pointer. In particular, if p points to a pointer, the procedure will include
merging the lists of pointers stored at locations ℓ1 and ℓi and updating the tags similar to the formula for simple
data types. Furthermore, when p is a pointer to a struct, each field is updated separately according to its type.
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5.3 Accessing Array Elements
The next common use of pointers in programming is manipulating arrays using pointers. Even
for statically allocated arrays, the array name is treated as a constant pointer that points to the
first element of the array. Hence, arrays and pointers are tightly coupled and pointers are used
extensively to work with arrays.
Array indexing. Because arrays are based on pointers, array indexing also applies to pointers.
Thus, we can see constructions such as p = a and p[i], where p is a pointer and a is an array, and
need to support them for pointers to private data. Pointer indexing p[i] with a pointer p to private
data and a public index i is implemented naturally, where we iterate through all locations in the
address list L of p, advance each of them by i multiplied by the size of the data type, retrieve the
data at the determined positions, and combine all of them using private tags for each location to
obtain the result. In other words, the computation is very similar to that of pointer dereferencing,
where instead of retrieving data at the positions specified in L, we advance each position by i data
items. (As C permits the use of negative indices, when i in p[i] is negative each location in L is
decremented by the necessary amount during this operation.)
Pointers as arrays with known bounds. In PICCO, statically allocated arrays of private
variables have the array size stored with them (which is known at the array creation time). Knowing
the size of the arrays allows the compiler to support of a number of important operations on arrays.
Most significantly, this permits the use of private indexing with arrays, when an element at a private
position i is retrieved from an array a using syntax a[i]. (The size of the array must be known to
support private indexing, regardless of what technique is used to implement it.) This also permits
the use of other operations such as inner (or dot) products on two arrays, which were introduced
to optimize runtime of compiled programs.
We treat private indexing as an essential part of secure computation with private data and
would like to see it supported for arrays dynamically allocated on the heap. This means that we
would like to offer pointer indexing p[i] with private i and private pointer p. The main challenge
that we need to overcome is the fact that the size of the memory pointed by p is not available in
C. Furthermore, a location stored in p may be arbitrary and do not correspond to a valid memory
address (i.e., be unaccessible by the program, correspond to memory marked as not being in use
or any location from the program’s stack, etc.). This means that a pointer can take on many
addresses which were not allocated for variable use and for which the corresponding size cannot
be meaningfully determined (i.e., accessing such addresses would trigger invalid memory access
exceptions in safe programming languages). The size of properly allocated memory, however, can
be determined and utilized to implement private indexing (and other operations that require array
size) with pointers to private data. In particular, all memory that malloc allocates on the heap is
marked with the size of each allocated block. Thus, we can use the information that malloc/free
maintain to determine whether a pointer content falls within a properly allocated memory block,
and if it is the case, access the block’s size and use it to implement private indexing.
In more detail, in addition to using private indexing with statically allocated arrays (as already
implemented in PICCO), we permit private indexing to be used with pointers to private data.
The latter is only successful if the location stored in the pointer5 was allocated via a prior call to
pmalloc (and it was not deallocated during a call to pfree). Because the secure implementation
that PICCO produces makes more calls to malloc than once per call to pmalloc, the program
5The current discussion refers to a single location stored in a pointer, which we view as the most common use of
private indexing. When the pointer contains multiple locations, the operation is performed on each location separately
and the results are combined in the same way as during pointer dereferencing.
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internally maintains a list of addresses returned by malloc that correspond to memory requested
by the user program (and an address is taken off the list if it is being freed). Then when private
indexing p[i] is called in the user program and the pointer stores address ℓ, we iterate through
the list of maintained addresses. For each such address l, we retrieve the corresponding block size
s from the information stored by malloc and check whether l ≤ ℓ < l+ s and the offset of ℓ from l
is a multiple of the data type size. If these checks succeed for at least one location on the allocated
address list, s is adjusted for the data type size and is used as the size of the array to which p
points. Note that with this implementation ℓ does not have to correspond to the beginning of the
memory block. Then when ℓ is not the address of the beginning of the array, i can legitimately
take negative values.
Under the circumstances when the address ℓ does not fall within any memory block dynamically
allocated by the user, private indexing operation is not performed and the returned result is set to
be secret-shares of 0 (note that, regardless to what value the result is set, it is not guaranteed to be
interpreted as an error). We thus proceed with the computation despite the error, but send signal
SIGBUS6 and store an error message in a fixed location, so that the program can catch the signal and
act on it. We note that the address that each call to pmalloc returns is always public information
and the programmer can avoid using invalid addresses. Ideally, the fact that the private indexing
operation cannot be carried out on the given address is determined before the program is run, at
compile time. Unfortunately, this will not always be possible and for some incorrectly written user
programs the error will not be triggered until the program is executed (i.e., even programming
languages that perform static analysis of user programs do array-bounds checking dynamically).
The best we can do is to perform static program analysis at compile time and warn the user about
places where such an error might be possible.
Pointer arithmetic. Pointers can be modified by setting the address to which they point to
the result of an arithmetic expression evaluation. While in C pointers can be used in arbitrary
expressions similar to the way integer variables are used, only a limited set of operations on pointer
variables is meaningful when they are used to store and manipulate addresses within the program.
For example, pointer arithmetic can be relied upon to increment or decrement a pointer value
by an integer amount to move to a different position within an array or between struct fields.
Many other arithmetic operations on pointer variables are not meaningful, and moving between
different variables using pointer arithmetic is unreliable and error-prone. Thus, in PICCO’s default
configuration we chose to disable pointer arithmetic involving pointers to private data in user
programs that the compiler processes. We introduce this as a mechanism for eliminating a large
class of programming errors without constraining expressiveness of user programs. That is, if we
want to change the pointer’s position within an array, instead of using p = p-i or p = p1+4*k+1,
the program will be written as p = &p[-i] and p = &p1[4*k+1], respectively. We note that
disabling pointer arithmetic for pointers to private data in the default configuration should not
be treated as a limitation of the compiler or our approach, but was a deliberate choice to reduce
programming errors without constraining expressiveness of user programs.
Nevertheless, turning off pointer arithmetic in PICCO makes it deviate from standard C. Fur-
thermore, there is a small class of functionalities that become disabled without pointer arithmetic.
One example of such functionalities is the use of embedded linked lists as, for example, implemented
in the Linux kernel. Embedded linked lists might rely on pointer arithmetic to move between differ-
ent fields of a struct. Thus, if the need for this or similar functionality when working with private
data arises in applications that use PICCO, the compiler can be configured with a command-line
flag to enable support for pointer arithmetic involving pointers to private data. We implement such
6Alternatively, custom SIGUSR1 or SIGUSR2 can be triggered if the user program is known not to use it.
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functionality as described below.
As mentioned before, in regular C, pointers can store any integer values and using pointer
variables in arithmetic expressions will result in evaluating the expressions on the integer values
stored in such variables. In the context of pointers to private data, we however distinguish between
pointer objects and (integer) addresses that pointer objects store. Thus, pointer content is no
longer equivalent to integer values, and we support pointer arithmetic with pointer objects only for
the purposes of using pointers to store and manipulate addresses. Such arithmetic operations can
be categorized into two groups:
1. Using pointers to private data in expressions of the type p + exp and p - exp, where exp
is an expression that evaluates to a (public) integer value. This operation produces the same
output as executing &p[exp], i.e., all locations stored in p are advanced by the amount of
space occupied by exp elements of the array.
2. Using pointers to private data in offset computation as in p1 - p2. This operation is straight-
forward to implement when both pointers store a single location. When, however, at least
one of them has multiple locations, our implementation computes the private difference be-
tween the true locations of the pointers. This option, in our opinion, implements the right
semantic value as opposed to other variants (such as computing pair-wise differences between
all addresses stored in the pointers) which bear little meaning.
Note that expressions of the type p + exp, and equivalently &p[exp], where exp evaluated to a
private integer, are not meaningful and not supported.
5.4 Pointer Casting
Variable casting refers to the ability to treat a variable of one type as a variable of another type.
Casting a constant or variable of one type to a constant or variable of another type typically results
in the value being preserved after the conversion (if possible) even if the two types use different
data representations. This means that conversion is likely to involve computation. In PICCO,
conversion between floating point and integer values is based on the algorithms given in [2], while
conversion between integer types of different sizes and floating point types of different sizes requires
minimal to no work (assuming no overflow or underflow detection is required when casting a value
to a shorter representation).
Pointer casting is handled differently and C is unique in the sense of allowing pointer-based
in-memory casting from one data type to another. Pointer casting involves no data conversion: the
memory is read as is and is interpreted as a sequence of elements of another type. Thus, pointer
casting is meaningful between a limited number of data types. In order to support pointer casting
in PICCO, we need to resolve the main question: because data representation of private data types
differs from data representation of the corresponding public data types, we need to determine how
to mimic sizes of public data types when working with blocks of private data without modifying the
data itself. That is, all secret shared values in PICCO are represented as elements of the same field,
which means that, for example, shares of a 16-bit integer and shares of a 64-bit integer have the
same bitlength. A programmer who casts memory storing an array of 64-bit integers to a pointer to
an array of 16-bit integers, however, expects to extract four 16-bit integers from each 64-bit integer.
This means that to meet the programmer’s expectations, private data will need to be processed
and assembled in a different form. We, however, cannot modify the original data because only the
pointer was cast, not the data itself.
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Instead of duplicating the memory and performing conversion at the time of casting, our solution
is to do the necessary computation at the time of pointer dereferencing. This means that we need
to record information about the data type from which casting was performed (to the data type of
the pointer) at the time of casting, but delay conversion until the pointer is dereferenced. We store
casting data type information with the pointer and use it to extract the relevant portion of the
memory at pointer dereferencing time. Note that in presence of a sequence of casts, only a single
data type needs to be maintained because the memory layout does not change.
Because in PICCO simple data types can be defined to have any bitlength, casting, for example,
a pointer of one integer type to a pointer of another integer type does not guarantee that one data
type will have a bitlength multiple of another. In that case we still calculate what the relevant
portion of the memory is based on the position of the memory being dereferenced, but the last,
partially filled, element might not be reliably extracted. For example, suppose some memory was
filled as a 3-element 30-bit integer array. When it is cast to an array of 20-bit integers, the fourth
elements will be extracted as bits 61–80 of the original data, while retrieving the fifth element might
result in memory violation because there is not enough data in the original array to fully form that
element.
5.5 Pointers to Functions
Similar to pointers to ordinary data types, we need to distinguish between pointers to functions that
will be treated as pointers to private data and pointers to functions that will be treated as pointers
to public data. The former can be used inside conditional statements with private conditions (as
a result of which they acquire multiple locations and the true location becomes private) and are
restricted to functions with no public side effects. The latter can contain pointers to functions of any
type, but cannot be modified or dereferenced inside conditional statements with private conditions.
The distinction is made at the time of pointer declaration using private/public qualifiers with void
data type. That is, by using private void *p, p will be treated similar to other pointers to private
data, while all pointers declared syntax public void *p will be treated as conventional C pointers.
Private pointers to functions are supported naturally in our implementation. When a pointer
stores a single location, the function is invoked as in conventional program execution. If, however,
a pointer acquires multiple locations as a result of its modification inside conditional statements
with private conditions, at the time of pointer dereferencing all functions stored in the pointer will
be executed, but only the effects of one of them will be applied. Conceptually this is the same as
executing branching statements with private conditions: all branches are executed, but only the
effects of one of them are applied depending on the result of private condition evaluation. That is,
when a pointer p storing α locations L = (ℓ1, . . . , ℓα) with the corresponding tags T = (t1, . . . , tα)
is being dereferenced, each function fi stored at address ℓi is being invoked. Then each (private)
variable a that fi modifies is set to a = ai · ti + aorig(1− ti), where aorig and ai are its original and
newly computed by fi values. If a is modified by multiple fi’s with indices i1 through ik, its value
is updated as a =
∑k
j=1 aij · tij + aorig(1−
∑k
j=1 tij ) (recall that only one ti can be set to 1).
6 Analysis
After discussing multiple aspects of private pointer design and its uses in programming, in this
section we summarize the notion of pointer to private data and operations on it and formally show
that program execution that involves pointers to private data complies with a standard definition
of security used in secure multi-party computation.
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A pointer to private data is defined as a C-style pointer to a private object storing location
information of the object, where a private object can be one of the following types:
1. a primitive private data type (private int, float, etc.);
2. a composite data type (C-style struct), each element of which is a private object;
3. a function with no public side effects;
4. a pointer to a private object.
The second and forth categories define a pointer to private data recursively, which means that
a pointer can have any indirection level, nested struct types, and any combination of primitive,
composite, and pointer data types. The previously defined operations on pointers to private objects
are:
1. Pointer read and update with value v, denoted as read(p) and update(p, v), respectively.
2. Dereferenced pointer read and update, denoted as read(*p) and update(*p, v), respectively.
3. Pointer update inside a conditional statement with a private condition. Following prior work,
we use multiplexor notation to denote this operation as mux(p, v1, v2, cond), where p is set
to v1 if private cond evaluates to 1 and to v2 otherwise. Pointer read inside a conditional
statement with a private condition is processed identically to a conventional read read(p)
and thus is not listed as a separate operation.
4. Dereferenced pointer update inside a conditional statement with a private condition, which
we denote as mux(*p, v1, v2, cond). Similar to the previous case, processing of dereferenced
pointer reads is not affected by the presence of conditional statements.
5. Dynamic memory allocation in the form of malloc; for an assignment p = pmalloc(n, type)
we use notation alloc(p, n, type).
6. Dynamic memory deallocation as in pfree(p), denoted as dealloc(p).
7. Array indexing p[i] with a public index i. This is treated as a generalization of pointer
dereferencing, and we use notation read(p, i), update(p, i, v), mux(p, i, v1, v2, cond) to
denote read, update, and update inside a conditional statement with a private condition,
respectively.
8. Array indexing p[i] with a private index i is also divided into three operations readp(p, i),
updatep(p, i, v), and muxp(p, i, v1, v2, cond). These operations can only be performed
on locations stored in a pointer that correspond to arrays with known bounds (i.e., allocated
using the pmalloc interface or static array declaration).
9. Evaluation of predicate f on one or more pointers p1, . . ., denoted as pred(f , p1, . . . ).
10. Pointer casting, denoted as cast(p, type), where type is the data type to which p is cast.
In the above, v, v1, and v2 correspond to either values associated with private objects or data
structures corresponding to pointers to private objects, depending on the context. The value of
cond is always a private bit, while variables n, i, and type are public. Any variable can be read
inside a conditional statement with a private condition, but updates can be performed only as
specified using the mux operations.
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This list implicitly defines operations that cannot be performed on pointers to private objects
and will be rejected by the compiler. That is, addresses of public objects cannot be used to update
a pointer to private data (either via update or mux); a pointer to public data or a mix of private
and private fields defined with a struct construct cannot be modified inside a conditional statement
with a private condition (i.e., there is no correspondingmux operation); pmalloc and pfree cannot
be called inside conditional statements with private conditions (i.e., there is nomux operations for
them); similarly, casting cannot be called inside conditional statements with private conditions as
it modifies publicly stored data.
Recall that our implementation of pointers maintains the invariant that in a well-formed pro-
gram there is exactly one true location associated with a private object. The invariant may be
violated only when memory associated with a pointer is being deallocated when the pointer is still
in use (in such a case, no tag is set to 1 and dereferencing the pointer will return no data).
In showing security of pointer-related operations that reference private data, we use a traditional
simulation-based definition of security. Because PICCO is built on top of (n, t)-threshold secret
sharing techniques with n ≥ 3 computational parties, we utilize the same setup in our security
analysis. Similarly, because the underlying techniques offer information theoretic security, we utilize
statistical (as opposed to computational) indistinguishability in the security definition.
Definition 1. Let parties p1, . . ., pn engage in a protocol Π that evaluates program P on a mix of
public and private data. Let VIEWΠ(pi) denote the view of pi during the execution of Π, which is
formed by its input, internal random coin tosses ri, and messages m1, . . .,mk passed between the
parties during protocol execution: VIEWΠ(pi) = (ini, ri,m1, . . .,mk). Let I denote a subset of the
participants of size t and VIEWΠ(I) denote the combined view of the participants in I during the
execution of Π. Protocol Π is said to be t-private in the presence of semi-honest adversaries if for
each coalition of size at most t < n/2 there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator SI that
given the input of the parties in I, P , and P ’s output, produces a view statistically indistinguishable
from VIEWΠ(I) together with the output of the parties in I.
Theorem 1. Any program P augmented with pointers to public and private data and no out-of-
boundary access compiled by PICCO is translated into a t-private protocol for any t < n/2 when
the computation is carried out by n parties.
Proof. Our proof proceeds by evaluating each operation involving a pointer to a private object as
summarized above. After building a simulator for each pointer-related operation, we apply the
composition theorem of Canetti [6] to the result, which would guarantee that any combination of
these operations (and other secure operations in PICCO) results in security of the overall program
P that the computational parties execute. Building our simulator requires only the use of t-private
implementations of addition/subtraction and multiplication operations (which is met in PICCO by
the underlying linear secret sharing scheme with t < n/2).
We describe a simulator for each operation involving a pointer to a private object in turn. Prior
to each operation, each party in the adversarial coalition I holds a share of each relevant private
data item (including private input data, private fields of pointer data structures, etc.) and at the
time of operation termination each party in I holds a share of the output and/or updated private
items. Many functions also modify data publicly available to each party (including the simulator).
• read(p): This operation simply retrieves the data structure stored in p and is local to each
computational party. The simulator does not interact with the parties in I.
• update(p, v): The data structure contained in v is simply copied into p by each party. The
simulator does not interact with the parties in I.
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• read(*p): When p stores only a single location, the value stored at that location is retrieved
and the simulator does not interact with the parties in I. When p stores multiple locations,
each party is instructed to iterate through the locations extracting values stored in them and
then combine the values using the private tags associated with each location as described in
Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Most of the procedure operates on public values (such as locations) and
the only private computation consists of multiplying tags with private data (or other tags in
case of pointers to pointers). The simulator thus participates in each multiplication operation
on behalf of honest users by invoking a simulator corresponding to the multiplication operation
the necessary number of times.
When p is a pointer to an object of a complex data type declared using struct and a single
field of p is being dereferenced (as in p->x), the way the simulator interacts with the parties
in I is not affected. (Only the locations from which values are retrieved are locally modified
by a known offset by each party.)
• update(*p, v): Similar to reading a referenced pointer, when p is associated with only one
location, value v is stored in that location without the parties interacting with the simulator.
When p stores multiple locations, each party in I iterates through all possible locations and
updates all locations using secure multiplications as described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Because
the locations (and their number) are always public, the simulator only needs to engage in a
pre-determined number of secure multiplications simulating all honest users, which is does by
invoking a simulator of the secure multiplication protocol.
When p points to a struct and only one field p->x is to be updated, the simulator’s interaction
with the parties in I is identical (but the valued are retrieved and the computed values are
placed not at the locations stored in p but the locations adjusted by the offset of x in the
struct).
• mux(p, v1, v2, cond): To implement conditional assignment, each party (and the simulator)
first locally merges the lists stored in v1 and v2, after which the (private) tags needs to be
updated based on the private condition cond as described in Algorithm 1. The simulator only
needs to participate in a certain number of secure multiplications determined by the public
contents of v1 and v2, which it performs as before by invoking a multiplication operation
simulator.
• mux(*p, v1, v2, cond): Conditional update of a dereferenced pointer involves modifying the
value stored at each location in p with a fixed function of v1, v2 and cond (see Section 4.2).
Thus, the simulator participates in a pre-determined number of secure multiplications simu-
lating all honest users using a simulator for secure multiplication.
• alloc(p, n, type): Allocating memory for a number n of private objects of type type does not
involve secure computation and thus the simulator does not interact with the parties in I for
the purpose of this operation.
• dealloc(p): First, if one of the locations stored in p corresponds to the special “uninitialized”
value, no party (including the simulator) performs any operation. Otherwise, the first location
ℓ1 is removed from the data structure that p stores and the values at all other locations
are updated using two secure multiplications (as described in Section 5.2). The simulator
produces communication on behalf of all honest users to simulate invocations of the secure
multiplication protocol as before. The parties consequently locate other pointers that store
ℓ1 and update their locations and tags using a procedure that depends only on public data.
24
The simulator is invoked to simulate a necessary number of secure multiplications on behalf
of honest users using the simulator of secure multiplication.
• read(p, i): Similar to a dereferenced pointer read, the simulator will need to simulate 0 or
more invocations of secure multiplications on behalf of honest users. The only difference from
the simulation of read(*p) is that the pointer locations are (locally) adjusted by the space
occupied by i items by each party (including the simulator) during the computation.
• update(p, i): This procedure is also very similar to update(*p), where the difference is only
in the local (publicly available) computation.
• mux(p, i, v1, v2, cond): Similar tomux(*p v1, v2, cond), the simulator will need to participate
in a pre-determined number of secure multiplications simulating all honest parties using its
simulator after some computation on public data.
• readp(p, i): To retrieve an element of an array represented by a pointer using a private
index, for each location stored in p that corresponds to a properly allocated memory block,
the parties together with the simulator perform a private table lookup. This operation is
implemented in PICCO by reading each element of the array and can be easily simulated
once the array size is determined using information publicly stored by each computational
party. Thus, for each eligible address stored in p the simulator simulates private table lookup
operation on behalf of honest users by invoking a private table lookup simulator, after which
the results from multiple locations (if present) are combined together using private tags,
during which the simulator engages in secure multiplication simulation.
• updatep(p, i, v): This operation proceeds similar to readp(p, i), but with some operations
performed in a different order. Each party in I and the simulator first locally determine
eligible addresses in p using public information, after which the parties and the simulator
need to modify the data being stored for each location using the location’s tag through secure
multiplication and then engages in the interaction for table update at a private location.
Thus, the simulator needs to engage in a pre-determined number of secure multiplication
simulations and then in simulating interaction corresponding to private table updates. As
before, the simulator can simply invoke the corresponding simulators for secure multiplication
and table updates at a private location.
• muxp(p, i, v1, v2, cond): Conditional update of an array element at a private index is
performed similar to the regular update. Here, the parties and the simulator can first combine
data of v1 and v2 using cond into a single v, where the simulator will need to engage in
simulating a fixed number of secure multiplications. After this they can follow the steps of
updatep(p, i, v) with the simulator producing messages as described for the simulation of
that operation.
• cast(p, type): This operation only updates public information associated with pointer p and
the simulator does not interact with the parties in I.
• pred(f , p1, . . . ): The simulator proceeds by evaluating the operations in f in order. For
any operation that uses a single pointer, the simulation proceeds according to one of the
above cases. For any operation that uses two pointers (most significantly, pointer equality
or inequality testing), the simulator first computes the public/private status of the result.
If the status is public, the result is determined locally. Otherwise, the simulator engages in
the computation associated with determining the (private) result by invoking the simulators
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corresponding to the operations used in the computation. Once any intermediate result in
evaluating f is computed to be private, any computation that uses the result is carried out
on private data by invoking simulators corresponding to the operations used in f .
This covers all possible operations with pointers to private objects and concludes the proof.
We note that our security result above is stated for programs that PICCO successfully compiles
and that do not contain out-of-boundary array accesses. As previously discussed, the compiler will
reject almost all types of improperly written programs during static analysis at compilation time.
For example, if a pointer to public data is modified inside a conditional statement with a private
condition, the program will not compile. This means that the compiler will filter out the majority
of programs with errors, while any well-formed program enjoys simulatable security.
The main type of errors that the compiler may not be able to detect during static analysis deal
with memory access to invalid locations (e.g., out of boundary array access, access to a hard-coded
invalid location, etc.). When such accesses are triggered, one or more computational parties might
not be able to continue with the execution and quit on error, but no privacy violations take place.
This is because while incorrect shares of private data might be read, the data will still remain in
the protected form and cannot be reconstructed without the programmer’s original intent. Note
that this discussion applies only to dereferencing a pointer with no offset (e.g., as in *p) or with
a publicly known offset (e.g., as in p[i] with public i) because in our implementation accessing
array at a private location never results in out of boundary access (i.e., calling this operation on
an improperly allocated array will be skipped at runtime).
Because the memory layout may differ on different platforms, illegal memory accesses might
result in different behavior of the computational parties (e.g., execution at one party might result
in a segmentation fault faster than at another party). As our simulator is not guaranteed to run in
an identical environment to those of the honest parties, the simulation might be distinguishable for
programs with illegal memory accesses based on the point of execution when any given party aborts
the computation. Thus, we exclude such programs from the security statement of Theorem 1, but
still guarantee that any program that compiles in our framework will not result in privacy violations.
To summarize, our solution guarantees that any program that can be compiled in our framework
never reveals any unauthorized information about private data. Simulation of a poorly written
program with illegal memory accesses may not be indistinguishable from its real execution, but any
properly written program enjoy simulation-based security.
7 Pointer-Based Data Structures
There are several popular data structures typically built using pointers. In this section we discuss
how they would be implemented using pointers to private data and in what complexities their
performance results. In particular, we explore linked lists, trees, stacks, and queues.
7.1 Linked Lists
A linked list consists of a sequentially linked group of nodes. For a singly linked list, each node is
composed of data and a reference in the form of a pointer to the next node in the sequence, while
for more complex variants such as doubly and circular linked lists the reference field incorporates
additional links. A linked list allows for efficient node insertion and removal, which makes it an
ideal candidate for implementation of stacks and queues as well as representation of graphs that
uses an adjacency list. In what follows, we discuss implementations of linked lists that store private
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data. We start by analyzing various operations in standard linked lists and then elaborate on the
special case when a linked list stores sorted data. The latter does not represent a typical use of
linked lists in programming (and does not necessarily have attractive features), but is provided as
a relatively simple way to demonstrate what form working with sorted data can take in a secure
computation framework.
Standard linked lists. Because of ubiquitous use of linked lists in programming, we analyze
different possible uses of linked lists and the corresponding operations. When a linked list stores
public data, node insertion has cost O(1) as a node is inserted in a fixed place (e.g., beginning or
end of the list). Performing a search requires O(n) time, where n is the number of nodes in the list,
because the nodes are traversed sequentially. Deleting a node from a fixed place (i.e., beginning
or end of the list as done in the case of stacks and queues) involves O(1) time, but when deletion
is preceded by a search (and the found node is deleted), the search together with deletion require
O(n) time.
When a linked list stores private data, the reference field holds a pointer to private data (i.e.,
a record of the same type) and at the time of node creation, the pointer stores a single location.
Without loss of generality, let nodes be inserted in the beginning of the list. Node insertion then
places a new node in the beginning of the list manipulating pointers as before, which still takes
O(1) time and is very efficient. Searching a list involves n private comparisons and all nodes need
to be processed as not to reveal the result of individual comparisons on private data and the total
work is O(n). Similarly, when a node is deleted from the beginning (or end) of the list, the time
complexity of the operation is O(1) and each node’s pointer still stores a single location. It is only
when nodes need to be removed from varying positions in the list and the position itself needs to
be protected, pointers can start acquiring multiple locations, which causes the time complexity of
list traversal and deletion after a search to go up. However, when the fact whether the searched
data was found in the list or not must remain private, we cannot remove any node, but instead
need to erase the content of a found node (if present) with a value that indicates “no data”. In this
case, all pointers still contain a single location and the cost of list search and other operations do
not change, but the list will never reduce in its size. We defer the discussion of the case when the
node is guaranteed to be found in a search and needs to be removed from a private location until
the end of this subsection.
Throughout this section, we express complexities of the operations as a function of n, where n
is the “visible” list size. This value will correspond to the actual list size when delete operations
remove an element from the list so that its size is reduced, while it will correspond to the number of
insertions (i.e., the maximum list size) when delete operations only mark data as deleted (to hide
whether the element was found or not), but not reduce the list size. The same notation applied to
other data structures discussed in this section when insertions/deletions are based on the result of
private conditions.
Sorted linked lists. As mentioned before, we discuss sorted linked lists only as a means of
demonstrating how sorted data might be processed using a general-purpose secure computation
compiler and it should be understood that this is not a typical use of linked lists or even not the
best way of working with sorted data. We use the results of this discussion in our consecutive
description.
Now when a node is being inserted in a linked list, the insertion position must be determined
based on the data stored in the list, which involves O(n) time with public data (and the complexities
of other operations are the same as before). When we work with private data, the location where
the node is being inserted must remain private (since it depends on private data) and the execution
needs to simulate node insertion at every possible position. Consider the following two ways of
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inserting a node and the performance in which they result:
1. Pointer updates: The first is a traditional implementation of node insertion in a linked list,
where if the correct insertion point is found, we update the pointer of the found node in the
list to point to the new node and the pointer of the new node to point to the next node in the
list. Because this conditional statement is based on private data, this will result in adding
one location to the pointer in the found node and one location to the pointer in the node
being inserted. After executing this operation for every node of the list, the pointer of each
node in the original list stores 2 locations and the pointer in the newly inserted node stores n
locations. When this operation is performed repeatedly, each node in the list acquires more
and more locations (to the maximum of the current list size). This means that if the list is
built by inserting one node at a time, the cost of node insertion and list traversal becomes
O(n2). Node deletion after a search also takes O(n2) time, while node deletion from a fixed
location is bounded by O(n). When, however, only a constant number of nodes are inserted
into an existing list (which, e.g., can be provided as sorted input into the program), the
complexity of all operations are unchanged from the public data case.
2. Data updates: Another possible implementation of sorted linked lists is to always insert a
new node at the beginning of the list and keep swapping its content with the next node
on the list until the correct insertion point is found. When this algorithm is implemented
obliviously on private data using an SMC compiler, the computation processes each node on
the list starting with the newly inserted node and based on the result of private comparison
of current and new data either performs the swap or keeps the data unchanged. After each
node insertion the reference field of each node still points to a single node in the list and
therefore the complexity of all operations are unchanged from their public versions.
Thus, it is clear that we want to avoid acquiring a large number of locations in each reference
field of a pointer-based data structure and privately moving data (as opposed to privately moving
pointers) is preferred when working with sorted data.
Node deletion in standard linked lists. We can now return to the question of deleting a node
from a private location in a standard (unsorted) linked list when it is known that the searched node
is present and needs to be removed from the list. The above two approaches of inserting a node in a
private position also apply to deleting a node from a private position. The first, standard, approach
of manipulating pointers will result in acquiring multiple locations at each pointer, which degrades
performance of all operations. Using the second approach of data updates, we can obliviously place
the data to be deleted into the first node on the list (after scanning the nodes and swapping values
based on private data comparisons) and then simply remove it from the list. This will maintain
optimal complexities of all operations. The above tells us that traditional implementations of
data structures can exhibit performance substantially worse than alternative implementations in
a secure computation framework and our analysis can be viewed as a step in making informed
decisions about implementation needs.
7.2 Trees
Trees implement hierarchical data structures commonly used to store sorted data and make search-
ing it easy. A tree node is typically comprised of data and a list of references to its child nodes. In
an n-node balanced search tree, all of searching, node insertion, and node deletion take O(log n)
time. Unfortunately, these complexities greatly change when we write a program to implement a
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search tree on private data. In what follows, we distinguish between trees that are pre-built using
the information available prior to the start of the computation and trees built gradually using
information that becomes available as the computation proceeds:
1. Pre-built trees. Consider a balanced binary search tree and suppose that we want to perform
a search on the tree. A traditional implementation involves O(log n) conditional statements
to traverse the tree from the root to a leaf choosing either the left or right child of the current
node. When the data is private, such statements use private conditions and thus both branches
of the computation must be executed. The result is that the sequence of O(log n) nested
private conditions results in executing all possible O(n) branches of the computation and
touches all nodes in the tree. This is an exponential increase in the complexity compared to
working with public data, even if we do not consider node insertions and deletions that result
in node rotations to balance the tree (which are discussed next together with gradually-built
trees).
2. Gradually-built trees. By analogy with inserting nodes into a sorted linked list, we can either
manipulate pointers to insert a new node at the appropriate place in the tree or insert the
node in a fixed location and move the data in place. The complexity of the latter option is
O(n) for insertions, deletions, and search and we take a closer look at the former. As we
traverse the tree looking for the place to insert the new node, similar to searching, all nodes
will be touched (as a result of nested private conditions). Furthermore, because the execution
cannot reveal the place into which the new node is inserted, pointers in all nodes will acquire
new locations. If we add computation associated with node rotations when the tree becomes
unbalanced, pointers will be acquiring new locations even faster (to the maximum of n−1 per
pointer). After repeatedly calling insert to gradually build the tree, eventually each node will
point to all other nodes resulting in O(n2) complexity for insertions, deletions, and searching.
Such complexity is clearly avoidable and alternative implementations should be pursued.
Search trees represent the worst possible scenario where implementing an algorithm on private
data using a general-purpose compiler incurs an exponential increase in its runtime compared to
the public data counterpart. As is evident from our discussion of linked lists and trees, searching
an n-element store for a single element cannot be performed in less than linear time using generic
techniques, regardless of whether the data is stored sorted or not. It means that without custom,
internally built implementations of specific data structures it is conceptually simpler and more
efficient to maintain data in unsorted form, use append for insertion (O(1) time), and shift data to
implement deletion.
7.3 Stacks
A stack is characterized by the last-in, first-out (LIFO) behavior, which is achieved using push and
pop operations. It has several fundamental applications such as parsing expressions (e.g., parsing
programs in compilers), backtracking, and implementing function calls within an executable pro-
gram. To the best of our knowledge, despite its popularity, this data structure has not been studied
in the context of secure multi-party computation before and our analysis and consecutive imple-
mentation of stack that works with private data demonstrate its appeal for secure computation.
A pointer-based implementation of a stack is built using a linked list, where a node is always
inserted at the head of the list and is always removed from the head as well, either of which
takes O(1) time. As was discussed in section 7.1, implementing these operations on private data
maintains constant time complexities.
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When using a stack with private data, we also consider the possibility that push and pop
operations might be performed inside conditional statements with private conditions, in which case
it is not publicly known whether the operation takes place and what record might be on top of the
stack. Then if we implement a conditional private push operation by manipulating pointers, the
top of the stack will store m+ 1 locations when the last m push operations were based on private
conditions. Implementing a push operation is then equivalent to executing the code:
1. node p = new node();
2. if (priv-cond)
3. p->next = top;
4. top = p;
Because both p and p->next store only a single location at the time of conditional push, merging
the lists of p->next and top takes O(m) time. Similarly, merging the lists of top and p takes O(m)
time.
Implementing a pop operation within a private condition involves executing code:
1. if (priv-cond)
2. temp = top;
3. top = top->next;
4. // use temp
The complexity of this operation is dominated by the second assignment. Because top points to
O(m) locations, and the next field of each of its locations can store O(m) locations as well, the
overall complexity of that assignment is O(m2). This means that the worst time complexity of a
conditional push becomes O(n) for a stack containing n records and it is O(n2) for a conditional
pop.
If we instead implement push and pop operations that depend on private conditions by main-
taining a single chain of records (with pointers containing a single location) and data update, push
and pop operations result in O(1) and O(n) work, respectively. That is, we can always insert a
new node (with data or no data depending on the private condition) into the stack and take O(n)
time during pop to privately locate the first node with data (and erase the data as necessary).
7.4 Queues
Queue is another important data structure used to maintain a set of entities or events in a specified
order which are waiting to be served. We can distinguish between first-in, first-out (FIFO), last-in,
first-out (LIFO), and priority queues. Implementing a queue involves maintaining two pointers:
the head and the tail. The head points to the beginning of the queue, i.e., the element that will be
removed by a dequeue operation, and the tail points to the last element added to the queue using
an enqueue operation.
Similar to the stack, when enqueue and dequeue operations in a FIFO queue are implemented
on public data or private data outside of private conditional statements, their complexities are O(1).
Their complexities for enqueue and dequeue operations are also O(n) and O(n2), respectively, when
implemented through private pointer manipulation (the implementation needs to maintain two
pointers for the head and tail of the queue, but updating the second pointer does not asymptotically
increase the amount of work) and O(1) and O(n), respectively, when private data update is used.
In a priority queue, each node additionally stores priority (which we assume is private) and
dequeue removes a node with the highest priority. The complexity of priority queue operations
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Data structure Insert Delete Search
Linked list O(1) O(1) O(n)
Linked list (delete at private location) O(1) O(n) O(n)
Search tree O(n) O(n) O(n)
Stack or queue O(1) O(1) —
Stack (conditional private push & pop) or
O(1) O(n) —
queue (conditional private enqueue & dequeue)
Priority queue
O(1) O(n) —
O(n) O(1) —
Priority queue (conditional private enqueue & dequeue) O(1) O(n) —
Table 1: Performance of various data structures using pointers to private data.
depends on the underlying data structure used to implement it. The best known complexities for
public data are O(log n) for enqueue (O(1) average case) and O(log n) for dequeue using a heap.
Suppose for now that all operations are outside conditional statements with private conditions.
If we use a linked list to store queue nodes, the best performance can be achieved using O(1) for
enqueue and O(n) for dequeue (i.e., always store a newly inserted node in the beginning and remove
the highest priority node from a private location as a result of the search for the highest priority
element) or O(n) for enqueue and O(1) for dequeue (i.e., store the list sorted and always remove the
first node during dequeue). Then if the operations depend on private conditions, we can maintain
O(1) for enqueue and O(n) for dequeue if the operations depend on private conditions using a very
similar approach to that of regular queues and stacks. That is, we always insert an element into the
beginning of the queue as a result of a conditional enqueue (if the condition is false, the element is
empty), and during dequeue we scan the queue for the highest priority element and erase it from
the queue if the condition is true.
If the underlying implementation is a heap, we insert a new node in a fixed leaf location and use
O(log n) compare-and-exchange operations to maintain the invariant of a max-heap to implement
enqueue. Realizing dequeue, however, requires O(n) work because it cannot be revealed what path
was traversed from the root to a leaf (since the path choice depends on private priorities). Similar
to other implementations, we can maintain these complexities even when enqueue and dequeue are
performed as a result of private condition evaluation.
7.5 Summary
Before we conclude this section, we would like to summarize performance of different data structures
that can be implemented on private data using newly introduced pointers to private data or records.
Table 1 lists the best performance we could achieve using a pointer-based implementation of the data
structures discussed in this section. Recall that in all data structures with conditional operations
performance depends on the number of insertions as opposed to the actual data size. We note that
the complexities in Table 1 can be directly linked to the amount of memory consumed by those
data structures, with small fixed constants hidden behind the asymptotic notation.
These data structures can also be evaluated using alternative mechanisms. For example, our
analysis suggests that implementing these data structures using arrays of private data instead of
pointers to private data would result in the same complexities (which is often the case for public
data as well). Also, utilizing ORAM-based implementation can improve asymptotic complexity
of some (but not all) data structures and can lead to faster runtime in practice at least for large
enough data sets. The most pronounced benefit of using ORAM will be observed for implementing
search trees, where all operations can be performed in polylogarithmic (in n) time (e.g., using the
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solution in [22]). On the other hand, using ORAM for linked lists can only increase the complexity
of its operations (even the complexity of a delete at a private location following a search cannot be
reduced below O(n)). Other data structures that can benefit from ORAM-based implementations
are stacks and queues where the operations that update the data structures are performed inside
private conditional statements. ORAM techniques, however, involve larger constants behind the
big-O notation than simple operations and their initial setup cost is also significant. We thus
leave a thorough comparison of ORAM vs. pointer or array based implementations of various data
structures in this framework as a direction of future work.
8 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we report on the results of our implementation and evaluation of a number of
representative programs that utilize pointers to private data. Because such programs have not been
previously evaluated in the context of secure multi-party computation, we cannot draw comparisons
with prior work. In some cases, however, we are able to measure the cost of using pointers, or
the cost of a pointer-based data structure, in a program by implementing the same or reduced
functionality that makes no use of pointers. Note that because PICCO can be used for both secure
multi-party computation and outsourcing, the inputs in these programs can come from one or more
input parties/clients.
The programs that we implemented and evaluated as part of this work are:
1. The first program constructs a linked list from private data read from the input and then
traverses the list to count the number of times a particular data value appears in the list.
This is a traditional implementation of a linked list, where each record with private data is
prepended to the beginning of the list when building it. The program is given in Figure 1.
We next notice that this program is sub-optimal in terms of its run time because it does
not utilize concurrent execution capabilities provided in PICCO. For that reason, we also
implement an optimized version of this program. The difference is that all private comparisons
during the list traversal are executed in a single round using PICCO’s batch constructs.
2. To evaluate pointer-based implementations that work with private data maintained in a sorted
form, and more generally privately manipulating pointer locations vs. obliviously moving
data, we build a program for a sorted linked list. The functionality of this program is similar
to that of the first program (i.e., create a linked list and then traverse it to count the number
of occurrences of a given data item in it) and the difference is in the way the list is build. We
evaluate two variants of the program corresponding to pointer update (PU) and data update
(DU) as described in section 7.1. The program for the DU variant is given in Figure 2, and
the program for the PU variant is given in Figure 3.
3. The third program implements mergesort that takes an array of unsorted integers as its input.
The program makes an extensive use of pointers to private data to pass data by reference to
a function that conditionally swaps two data items based on their values (i.e., performs the
so-called compare-and-exchange operations). Mergesort was chosen not necessarily because it
provides the best performance for an oblivious sort, the objective instead was to demonstrate
how performance of a program that utilizes pointers to private data (and exercises modular
design of a program) compares to a similar program that does not use pointers. We thus
also evaluate another version of mergesort that performs compare-and-exchange operations
in place (without calling any function) and makes no use of pointers. The pointer-based
mergesort is given in Figure 4 and its non-pointer-based implementation is given in Figure 5.
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struct node {
private int data;
struct node *next;
};
public int count = 128;
public int main() {
public int i;
private int array[count], output;
struct node *ptr, *head = 0;
smcinput(array, 1, count);
//construct the list
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
ptr = pmalloc(1, struct node);
ptr->data = array[i];
ptr->next = head;
head = ptr;
}
//traverse the list
privaate int val = 10;
ptr = head;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (ptr->data == val)
output = output+1;
ptr = ptr->next;
}
smcoutput(output, 1);
return 0;
}
Figure 1: Construction and traversal of a linked list.
4. Our last program implements a shift-reduce parser for a context-free grammar (CFG) on
private data. This is one of fundamental applications that can now be naturally implemented
using the compiler by building and maintaining a stack, once support for pointers to private
data is in place. We choose a CFG that corresponds to algebraic expressions consisting of
additions, multiplications, and parentheses on private integer variables, which is specified as
follows:
statement → statement | statement + term
term→ term | term * factor
factor → var | (statement)
Here, all variables are shown in italics, while terminals are set in bold font. The grammar can
obviously be generalized to more complex expressions and programs that work with private as
well as public variables of different types. We view this application as enabling one to evaluate
a custom function on private data without writing and compiling a separate program for each
function. That is, both the function to be evaluated and its input (consisting of private data)
are provided as input to the parser. We note that it is possible for the function or the grammar
rules to be private as well, but this would result in an increase in the program performance.
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struct node {
int data;
struct node *next;
};
public int count = 128;
public int main() {
public int i, j;
private int array[count], output, tmp;
struct node *head, *ptr1, *ptr2;
smcinput(array, 1, count);
//construct the list
head = pmalloc(1, struct node);
head->data = array[0];
for (i = 1; i < count; i++) {
ptr1 = pmalloc(1, struct node);
ptr1->data = array[i];
ptr1->next = head;
head = ptr1;
ptr2 = head;
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if (ptr2->data > ptr2->next->data) {
tmp= ptr2->data;
ptr2->data = ptr2->next->data;
ptr2->next->data = tmp;
}
ptr2 = ptr2->next;
}
}
//traverse the list
private int val = 10;
ptr1 = head;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (ptr1->data == val)
output = output+1;
ptr1 = ptr1->next;
}
smcoutput(output, 1);
return 0;
}
Figure 2: Construction and traversal of a sorted linked list (using data update).
Our parser uses one lookahead character, and due to the complexity of the implementation,
the program itself is not included in the paper.
To approximate performance overhead associated with using a pointer-based stack, we create
a program that performs only arithmetic operations on private data which are given to the
parser and which the parser executes. Note that unlike evaluation of mergesort, these are
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Program
Field Data size
size (bits) 25 28 211 214 217 220
Linked list
81
0.0004 ± 5% 0.003 ± 4% 0.014 ± 3% 0.097 ± 2% 0.760 ± 1% 5.40 ± 1%
(list building, traversal, 0.086 ± 1% 0.661 ± 1% 5.30 ± 3% 42.27 ± 1% 337.8 ± 1% 2,692 ± 2%
and optimized traversal) 0.026 ± 7% 0.140 ± 3% 1.019 ± 1% 8.051 ± 2% 63.75 ± 1% 513.8 ± 1%
Shift-reduce parser 33 0.005 ± 9% 0.039 ± 2% 0.307 ± 1% 2.439 ± 1% 19.73 ± 2% 157.2 ± 1%
Arithmetic operations 33 0.005 ± 9% 0.038 ± 3% 0.294 ± 1% 2.336 ± 1% 18.85 ± 1% 150.8 ± 1%
Table 2: Performance of representative programs with unsorted data structures measured in sec-
onds.
Program
Field Data size
size (bits) 24 25 26 27 28 29
Sorted linked list (DU)
81
0.466 ± 1% 1.908 ± 1% 7.750 ± 1% 31.24 ± 1% 125.5 ± 1% 565.5 ± 1%
(list building and traversal) 0.036 ± 1% 0.071 ± 1% 0.142 ± 1% 0.284 ± 1% 0.567 ± 1% 1.311 ± 1%
Sorted linked list (PU)
81
1.464 ± 1% 9.956 ± 1% 85.51 ± 2% 918.6 ± 2% 9,900 ± 3% N/A
(list building, traversal, 0.051 ± 1% 0.149 ± 2% 0.613 ± 2% 5.285 ± 2% 45.93 ± 2% N/A
and head node removal) 0.005 ± 1% 0.015 ± 1% 0.044 ± 2% 0.174 ± 2% 0.720 ± 3% N/A
Mergesort without pointers 81 0.053 ± 5% 0.121 ± 5% 0.271 ± 5% 0.625 ± 4% 1.453 ± 4% 3.124 ± 4%
Mergesort with pointers 81 0.053 ± 4% 0.122 ± 5% 0.272 ± 5% 0.638 ± 6% 1.503 ± 5% 3.201 ± 5%
Table 3: Performance of representative programs with sorted data structures measured in seconds.
not equivalent functionalities. That is, one program is much more complex, parses its input
according to the CF grammar, maintains a stack, etc., while the other only performs additions
and multiplications.
Note that most of these programs already exercise dynamic memory allocation (i.e., all linked list
programs and the shift-reduce parser). However, to provide a more complete evaluation of dynamic
memory management, we also include experiments that measure the overhead of dynamic memory
deallocation. Thus, we incorporate calls to pfree to two programs: (i) we call pfree as part of
the shift-reduce parser at the end of each pop operation and (ii) we evaluate the cost of removing
the head node in a sorted linked list built using pointer update (Figure 3). These were chosen as
natural applications of memory deallocation, where pointers to private objects contain a single and
multiple locations, respectively. In the second case, the head stores locations of all nodes on the
list and the overhead of pfree includes updating the structures of other pointers on the list upon
memory deallocation.
Each program was compiled using PICCO, extended with pointer support as described in this
work, and run in a distributed setting with three computational parties. All compiled programs
utilize the GMP library for large number arithmetic and OpenSSL to implement secure channels
between each pair of computational parties. We ran all of our experiments using three 2.4 GHz
6-core machines running Red Hat Linux and connected through 1Gb/s Ethernet.
Each experiment was run 10 times, and we report the mean time over all runs and the corre-
sponding deviation from the mean observed in the experiments. The results of the experiments for
working with unsorted and sorted data are given in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
As can be seen from the tables, each program was run on data of different sizes. For all linked
lists programs as well as mergesort, the data size corresponds to the number of elements in the
input set, while for the shift-reduce parser and arithmetic operations the size corresponds to the
number of arithmetic operations in the formula, which were a mix of 90% multiplications and 10%
additions. All linked list experiments contain two different times, which correspond to the times to
build and traverse the linked list, respectively. The tables also report the size of field elements in
bits used to represent secret shared values. While all programs were written to work with 32-bit
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integers, most programs in the table use statistically secure comparisons, which requires the length
of the field elements to be increased by the statistical security parameter (which we set to 48).
(The size of the field elements needs to be the size of the data plus one bit to ensure that all data
values can be represented.)
The results tell us that working with linked lists (the first program in Table 2) in the secure
computation framework is very efficient. That is, building a linked list that consists of thousands
of elements takes a fraction of a second. Traversing a linked list is also rather quick, where going
through a linked list of size 211 about 1 second in our optimized program.
Performance of the sorted linked lists (the first two programs in Table 3) characterizes per-
formance expected from different data structures where it is necessary to hide the place where a
new node or data item is being inserted. As previously mentioned, there is no good reason to
implement the PU variant of different data structures and it is provided here for sorted linked lists
for illustration purposes only. The DU version of sorted linked list has the same list traversal time
as the regular (unsorted) linked lists, and the reported time for sorted linked lists can be further
optimized in the same way as it was done for regular linked lists. When we are building a sorted
linked list via DU, each operation takes O(n) time and thus the time to perform this operation
for all n elements of the input is O(n2). This quadratic performance is also observed empirically
where increasing the size of the data set by a factor of 2 results in four-time increase in the list
building time (all insertion operations are performed sequentially). As far as the head node removal
operation in a sorted linked list with PU goes, it consists of two pointer dereferences (i.e., using
data and next fields) and one call to pfree, where the overhead of pfree was between 76.4% to
81.3% of that operation’s time. In this particular experiment, each pointer stores O(n) locations,
which contributes to the complexity of both memory deallocation and pointer dereferencing, but
the latter operation can be performed more efficiently.
If we next look at mergesort (the last two programs in Table 3), we see that the variant that
uses pointers to private data and makes a function call to a compare-and-exchange operation for
each comparison and the variant with no pointers and corresponding function calls differ in their
performance by a very small amount. The non-pointer version that performs less work is faster by
0.4–2.4%.
Lastly, the performance of our shift-reduce parser (the second program in Table 2) is extremely
fast and is almost entirely consists of the time it takes to evaluate the provided formula on private
data (the second program in Table 2). That is, despite having a more complex functionality and
employing pointer-based stack, the time to perform arithmetic operations only is almost the same as
the time the parser takes. Also, adding pfree to the program does not effect the runtime (because
the pointer stores a single address) and the times with memory deallocation are omitted from the
table.
As far as memory consumption goes, the introduction of pointers to private data only marginally
affects the amount of allocated memory for programs with pointers storing a single memory location
(linked list, shift-reduce parser, and mergesort). The amount of memory needed to store and process
sorted linked lists is quadratic in the data size and matches in its complexity list traversal. Removing
a node from the list and calling pfree reduces the memory consumed by the data. While in general
calls to pfree can increase memory consumption, in this case all pointers store the same lists of
O(n) locations and removing a node and merging the lists in pfree decreases the size of each list.
In general, we can say that memory consumption is at most quadratic in the amount of data and
user-declared variables in any program.
We note that all functionalities used for our experiments have alternative implementations using
arrays. For linked lists, mergesort, and a shift-reduce parser, we expect array-based implementation
to exhibit very similar performance to that based on pointers because all pointers store a single
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location. For sorted linked lists, we expect array-based programs to have performance similar to
our data update implementation (with the same asymptotic complexities). To confirm this finding,
we evaluated performance of array-based sorted linked lists, the source code of which can be found
in Figure 6. Building the sorted list took about 20% less time using arrays for most data sizes, while
list traversal was about 9% slower using arrays for most data sizes. Thus, both implementations
exhibit comparable performance. Memory consumption is also similar in most programs, with the
exception of array-based sorted list implementation that uses memory linear in the data size.
Performance of our pointer-based programs can also be compared to that of array-based imple-
mentations using another system or compiler. Sharemind [5] is a powerful system that supports a
wide range of programs and, similar to PICCO, builds on (a different type of) information-theoretic
secret sharing, which is hand-optimized to work with three computational parties. Despite similari-
ties of the setup, Sharemind programs exhibit significantly different performance characteristics. In
particular, the implementation is optimized for performing a large number of identical operations
in a batch, while the cost of performing only a single operation is high (e.g., on the order of 100ms
for a single integer equality test [4]). As such, Sharemind programs will perform significantly worse
(i.e., orders of magnitude slower) on our programs that perform sequential execution, such as un-
optimized linked list traversal, the shift-reduce parser, and building a sorted linked list (mergesort
is also slower as reported in [23]). In the case of optimized linked list traversal, on the other hand,
Sharemind implementations will still be slower for small data sets (such as 25), but significantly
faster for large data sets (up to two orders of magnitude faster for 220 elements).
All of these experiments demonstrate that pointers have a great potential for their use in
general-purpose programs evaluated over private data. Some pointer-based data structures can
exhibit substantially higher performance in this framework than their public-data counterparts,
and custom, internally built implementations for such data structures are recommended.
9 Conclusions
In this work, we introduce the first solution that incorporates support for pointers to private
data into a general-purpose secure multi-party computation compiler. To maintain efficiency of
pointer-based implementations, we distinguish between pointers with public addresses and pointers
with private addresses and introduce the latter only when necessary. We provide an extensive
evaluation of the impact of our design on various features of the programming language as well as
evaluate performance of commonly used pointer-based data structures. Our analysis and empirical
experiments indicate that the cost of using pointers to private data is minimal in many cases.
Several pointer-based data structures retain their best known complexities when they are used
to store private data. Complexity of others (most notably balanced search trees) increases due
to the use of private data flow, and custom, internally built implementations of oblivious data
structures that work with sorted data are recommended. We hope that this work provides valuable
insights into the use of various programming language features when developing programs for
secure computation using a general-purpose compiler, as well as highlight benefits and limitations
of pointer-based designs for SMC compiler developers.
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//global declarations are the same as in Fig. 2
public int main() {
public int i, j;
private int array[count], output;
struct node *head, *ptr1, *ptr2;
smcinput(array, 1, count);
//construct the list
ptr1 = pmalloc(1, struct node);
ptr2 = pmalloc(1, struct node);
ptr1->data = array[0];
ptr2->data = array[1];
if (array[0] < array[1]) {
head = ptr1;
head->next = ptr2;
} else {
head = ptr2;
head->next = ptr1;
}
for (i = 2; i < count; i++) {
ptr1 = pmalloc(1, struct node);
ptr1->data = array[i];
ptr1->next = 0;
ptr2 = head;
if (ptr1->data < ptr2->data){
ptr1->next = ptr2;
head = ptr1;
}
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if ((ptr2->data < array[i]) &&
(ptr2->next->data > array[i])) {
ptr1->next = ptr2->next;
ptr2->next = ptr1;
}
ptr2 = ptr2->next;
}
if (ptr2->data < ptr1->data)
ptr2->next = ptr1;
}
//traversal code is the same as in Fig. 2
// remove the head node
val = head->data;
ptr1 = head;
head = head->next;
pfree(ptr1);
smcoutput(val, 1);
return 0;
}
Figure 3: Construction and traversal of a sorted linked list (using pointer update).
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public int K = 128;
public void swap(private int* A, private int* B) {
private int tmp;
if (*A > *B) {
tmp = *A;
*A = *B;
*B = tmp;
}
}
void mergesort(private int *A, public int l, public int r) {
public int i, j, k, m, size;
size = r - l + 1;
if (r > l) {
m = (r + l)/2;
[ mergesort(A, l, m); ]
[ mergesort(A, m + 1, r); ]
for (i = size >> 1; i > 0; i = i >> 1)
for (j = 0; j < size; j += 2*i) [
for (k = j; k < j + i; k++) [
swap(&A[k+l], &A[k+i+l]);
]
]
}
}
public int main() {
public int median = K/2;
private int A[K];
smcinput(A, 1, K);
mergesort(A, 0, K-1);
smcoutput(A[median], 1);
return 0;
}
Figure 4: Mergesort median program with pointers.
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public int K = 128;
private int A[K];
void mergesort(public int l, public int r) {
public int i, j, k, m, size;
size = r - l + 1;
int tmp[size];
if (r > l) {
m = (r + l)/2;
[ mergesort(l, m); ]
[ mergesort(m + 1, r); ]
for (i = size >> 1; i > 0; i = i >> 1)
for (j = 0; j < size; j += 2*i) [
for (k = j; k < j + i; k++) [
tmp[k] = A[k+l];
if (A[k+l] > A[k+i+l]) {
A[k+l] = A[k+i+l];
A[k+i+l] = tmp[k];
}
]
]
}
}
public int main() {
public int median = K/2;
smcinput(A, 1, K);
mergesort(0, K-1);
smcoutput(A[median], 1);
return 0;
}
Figure 5: Mergesort median program without pointers.
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public int count = 128;
public int main() {
public int i, j;
private int input[count], data[count], a, tmp, output;
smcinput(input, 1, count);
// build the sorted array
data[0] = input[0];
for (i = 1; i < count; i++) {
// move the data if necessary
a = input[i];
for (j = 0; j < i-1; j++) {
if (a < data[j]) {
tmp = data[j];
data[j] = a;
a = tmp;
}
}
data[i-1] = a;
}
// traverse the array searching for all instances of the value stored in a
a = 5;
output = 0;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (data[i] == a)
output = output+1;
}
smcoutput(output, 1);
return 0;
}
Figure 6: Construction and traversal of a sorted list (using a static array).
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